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recent studies of manufacturer and retailer the food have raisedTwoTwo recent studies ofmanufacturer and retailerprofitabilityprofitability inin the food industryindustry have raised questionsquestions 
about whether the cited, but empin’cally untested, shift of power from manufacturers to retailersabout whether the widelywidely cited, but empirically untested, shift ofpowerfrom manufacturers to retailers 
has occurred. Has the been under a or are thesehas reallyreally occurred. Has the marketingmarketing communitycommunity been operatingoperating under a misconceptionmisconception or are these 
studies flawed? This paper uses more measures of exercised and market power andstudies flawed? This paper uses more completecomplete measures ofexercised andpotentialpotential market power and 
a broader sample of industries and retail classes to address this critical Not only do our mea­a broader sample ofindustries and retail classes to address this critical question.question. Not only do ourmea­
sures have strong theoretical grounding in the industrial organization, finance and accountingsures have strong theoretical grounding in the industrial organization, finance and accounting 
literature, they incorporate in them the impact of actions that have been commonly cited as illustrationsliterature, they incorporate in them the impact ofactions that have been commonly cited as illustrations 
of a power shift. Our analysis of 14 consumer good industries shows that only a few of them exhibit aofa power shift. Our analysis of14 consumer good industries shows that only a few of them exhibit a 
shifr in market power towards retailers. Further this apparent shifr is highly influenced by a small num­shift in market power towards retailers. Further this apparent shift is highly influenced by a small num­
ber of retailers within a single retail class.ber ofretailers within a single retail class. 
The ideal of a system in which market values alone control, is impossible of realizationThe ideal ofa system in which market values alone control, is impossible of realization 
because goods always move through a power structure and not through the neutral type ofbecause goods always move through a power structure and not through the neutral type of 
facility which may be suggested by the term “marketing channel. ” facility which may be suggested by the term "marketing channel. " 
-Wroe Alderson ( 1955)
-Wroe Alderson (1955) 
At no time has the balance of power between manufacturers and retailers received more atten-Atno time has the balanceofpower between manufacturers and retailers receivedmore atten­
tion than in recent years. Beginning with articles in the business press, statements about ation than in recent years. Beginning with articles in the business press, statements about a 
shift in power from manufacturers to the trade have slowly but surely made their way intoshift in power from manufacturers to the trade have slowly but surely made their way into 
the academic literature as well (see Alpert, Kamins and Graham, 1992; Chu, 1992; Buzzell,the academic literature as well (see Alpert, Kamins and Graham, 1992; Chu, 1992; Buzzell, 
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Quelchl  and Salmon,, 1990;90; Olver and Farris,, 198989 for somee examples).ples). Increasingsi g retailertail r 
concentration,ntration, accessces  to scannerner technology,chnology, erodingi  brand loyalty due to increasesses in price 
promotionstions and privatete labelsl  arere the commonlyl  mentionedti ed causesses of  the rise in retailertailer 
powerr relativel ti  to manufacturers.ufacturers. However,r, concreterete empiricaliri l evidencece in supportport of  thisi  
purportedrted powerr shifti hass notbeenn provided.i d. In fact,t, tworecentnt empiricaliri l studiesdies of thefood 
industrytry (Farrisi  and Ailawadi,ila a  1992;92; Messingerr and Narasimhan,i an, 1995)95) and one analyticall tical 
paperer (Kimi  and Staelin,li , 1994)94) havee raisedi d questionsstions aboutt whetherther thisi  powerr shifti  hass reallyll  
occurred.rred. Neitherr empiricaliri l studydy wass ablel  to verifyi  thee shifti  of  marketrket powerr throughr gh anal­
ysess of  changesges in profitability.bilit . Has the entiretire marketingr eting communitynity beenn operatingrating underr 
a seriousri s misconception,ception, or are thee studiesdies thatt have questionedstioned the powerr shifti  flawed?? It  
would seeme  thatt the answers er to thisi  questionstion is critical for both academicsdemics and practitioners.ctitioners. 
l-
Three majorj r objectionsti s can be raisedi d aboutt thesese studiesdies thatt deserveserve furtherer investiga­ti ­
tion. The first is thatt theyy usedd the wrong measuresure of  profitability.il  Accounting ratestes of  
return,t rn, such ass thosese analyzedl d by thesese authors,thors, have historicallyri l  beenn criticized ass weak 
“true”indicatorst rs of  " " economico ic profit.fi . The secondcond is thatt profit alone,l , howeverer measured,asured, is 
an incompletel te measureasure of  power.r. Althoughlt  profit is a commonlyl  usedd indicatorr of marketrket 
powerr in the economici  and industrialri l organizationi ti  literature,ture, marketr t powerr may not be 
immediatelyi tely reflectedted in profitability.bilit . Further,er, while profitabilityil  is a well-acceptedpted indica­
torr of  marketrket powerr in the economico ic and industrialtri l organizationi tion literature,ture, the behavioralavioral 
-
occur-view of  powerr hass traditionallyiti al  beenn different.nt. Third, many majorj  shiftsi  have beenn r­
ring  outside traditionalal supermarketr t channels that may make supermarketsr ts a poor 
super-barometerr eter for broaderer trendsnds in retailing.taili . For example,ple, Wal-Marta  is not a partrt of  the er­
marketrket sample,ple, but it is clearlyrl  one of  the firms thatt is mostt often cited ass an exampleple of  
the powerr shift.i . In fact,t, measuresasures of  powerr which do not show increasesses for thisi  companyany 
would lack facee validityl  in the view of  mostt marketers.rketers. 
A  broaderer sampleple and bettertter measuresasures arere neededded to addressres  thesese issues.es. In thisi  paperer we:: 
discussss somee ofthe shortcomingsrtco ings of  using accountingti g ratestes of  returnt rn such ROS and 
ROA  ass indicatorst rs of  marketrket power;r; 
1..  t  
2..	 distinguishi  betweent een exercisedrcised and potentialntial power,r, integratingrating the behavioralavioral and 
economicic views of powerr into our conceptualptual framework;ework; 
3..	 use measuresasures with a strongr ng theoreticaloretical base in the industrialtri l organization,nization, finance 
and accountingnting literature,ture, thatt have recentlyntly gainedi d prominencei ce in the businessi ss 
press,ss, to assessses  both exercisedrcised and potentialntial power;r; and 
4..	 examinei e trendsnds in thesese measuresasures and otherr relevantt variablesi l s for a wide varietyri ty of  
consumerer goodss industriestri s and differentt retailtail classes.ses. 
MARKETET POWERER ANDD PERFORMANCE:FORMANCE:
 
THE  THEORETICALORETICAL FOUNDATIONUNDATION
 
Transactionsactions betweentwe n twoo operatingrating systemsstems alwayss involvel e thee two factorsrs of economiconomic val­l­
ues and thee balancel ce ofpower.el: 
-Aldersonlderson (1955)9 5) 
In thisi  section,ction, we briefly reviewi  somee key conceptsepts from the behavioralavioral channelsnels litera­
ture and economicc theory that are relevantt to our work  on the market power  of  
-
manufacturersufacturers versusus retailers.tailers. Our objectiveti  is to integraterate the two views to the extentnt pos­
sible and utilize them in thee developmentl p ent of  our measures,asures, while alsol  pointing out the maini  
differences.ces. 
-
Powerer and  Economicnomic Theoryry 
Thee relativel tive power of  thee retailingtaili g and manufacturingnufacturing stagesges determinestermines thee distributiontri ution of  
rentsts betweentwe n stages.ages. 
-Porterrter (1974)974) 
In industrialtri l organizationization theory,eory, the use of  profit to assessses  marketrket powerr datestes back to 
Lerner's originall measureasure of  monopolyl  powerr (1934)-the)-the long-termr  differencece betweent een 
price and marginalr i al cost,t, ass a ratioti  of  price,, calledl  the Price-Cost Margin. This relationshipl ti ship 
m ’
betweent een marketrket powerr and profit hass been formalizedli d in the well-known Structure-Con­t re-Con­
duct-Performance paradigm,i , pioneered by Bain  (1968).). Accordingcc rding to this paradigm,i , 
increasedsed industrytry concentrationntration (structure)r cture) permitsr its firms within an industrytry to collude and 
p  
decreasecrease competition.etition. This confersf rs monopolyl  powerr on the firms thatt is evidencedi ced or mea­
suredr d by theirir high economici  profit rates.tes. Althoughlt  industriali l organizationi tion researchearch hass 
-
evolvedl  from a searcharch for empiricaliri l regularitiesl rities in cross-industry-i stry studiesdies to industry-spe­
cific modelsels wherere the regularitiesl rities can be tested,sted, overr the pastt decadecade (Sutton,ton, 1991),91), thee 
basici  relationshipi i  betweent en marketr t power and economici  profit hass not been questioned.stioned. 
try-spe-
This economicic conceptpt of  powerr hass alsol  beenn appliedli d to channelsnels of  distributioni ti  by sev­
erall researchersearchers (e.g.,. ., Porter,er, 1974;74; Reekie,i , 1975;75; Steiner,i er, 1978;78; Albionlbion and Farris,, 1981;81; 
Grant,t, 1987).87). For instance,nce, Porterr (1974,4, 1976)76) arguesues thatt the ratestes of  returnt rn obtainedi ed by 
manufacturersufacturers decreasecrease ass the bargainingr aining powerr of  retailerstailers increases.ses. Dickson, Schneier,eier, 
-
Steidtmanni ann and Farris (1994)4) studydy the balancel ce of  marketrket powerr and profit betweent een sup­
pliers and buyersrs in an experimentalri ental economicso ics framework.ework. Economici  modelsels of  channelnel 
relationshipsl ti ships and coordination,i tion, wherere the balancel ce of  powerr is a determinantterminant of  how totaltal 
channelel profits are divided betweenen channelel members,bers, arer  also relevantt in thisi  contextxt 
(e.g.,. ., Kimi  and Staelin,li , 1994;4; Ingene and Parry,ry, 1995;5; Chu, 1992;92; McGuireuire and Staelin,li , 
­
1986;86; Jeuland and Shugan,n, 1983).83). To summarizearize the Structure-Conduct-Performanceture-Conduct-Performance par­
adigm in the context of  manufacturers and retailers,i  increased retailer power over 
manufacturersf t rers should be accompaniedi  by reduceded inter-retailer competitionti  and and 
increasese in retaileril r margin,r i , while att the samee time leadingi  to higherr inter-manufacturernufacturer 
competitionetition and lower manufacturerufacturer margin.rgin. 
In discussingi  availablei l  measuresasures of  the price-costt margin,r i , Bain (1968)8) notedd thatt the 
r-
maini  differencece betweent en accountingnting coststs and "economic" coststs lies in the factt thatt the lat­
terr includes the value of  the servicesrvi es of  funds investedted by the owners,rs, and is measuredasured ass 
“ ic” ­
an interestr st returnrn on owners' investment,t ent, calculatedl l ted att the bestst net interestrest ratete theyy couldl  
earnr  elsewhere.ere. Thus, excessss or residuali l profits are earnedr d only to the extentt thatt the 
’ 
accountingnting profit exceedseeds thisi  interestr st ratete timess the valuel  of  owners' investment.t ent.’ 
There has been some debatete over cross-sectional- ctional comparisonsrisons of  accountingti g ratestes of  
return.r . Some researchersarchers have noted thatt thesese returnsr s may suffer from differencess in 
accountingting practicetice and otherr firm specificcifi  biasess thatt we arer  unablel  to observerve or even 
predictict the directionti  of  (Fisher and McGowan,o a  1983;3; Benston,t n, 1985).85). Unfortunately,tely, thesese 
authorsthors do not provide a solutioni  to the problem,l , and the debateate over the extentnt to which 
accountingti  profits can be used ass indicators of  economici  profit continues (seee Martin, 
1984;4; Long and Ravenscraft,scraft, 198484 for opposingi  arguments).u ents). We note two importantnt points 
in thisi  connection.ction. First, thee factt thatt somee measureasure of  profit is a valid indicatorr of  marketrket 
cross-powerr is not att issue.. Second,nd, firm specificcifi  biasess in accountingnting returnst rns thatt affectt s­
sectionalti nal studiesdies are not a concernrn in time seriesries trendsnds att the aggregateregate industrytr  level.l. In 
con-fact,t, examiningi i  changesnges overr time is a commonlyl  usedd approachroach to econometricallyetrically ­
troll for firm-specifici  biasess (see,e, for example,ple, Boulding and Staelin,li , 1990).90). Even in the 
unlikely  eventt thatt therere are systematicte atic differenceses betweent en the accountingti g practicestices of  
manufacturersufacturers and retailerstailers in eachch of  the industriestries we examine,ine, the time trendsnds of  theirir 
relativel ti  profitabilityil  cannott be affected,cted, and certainlytainly not reversed.rsed. 
For the purposesses of  our work,, the majorj  conclusionsl i s thatt we draw from thisi  literatureture are:re: 
1..	 As the marketrket powerr enjoyedj  by a channelel member,ber, relativel ti e to another,other, increases,ases, 
one would expectct its relativel ti  economico ic profit to alsol  increase.ase. 
Accounting ratestes of  returnrn ignore an importantnt componentent of  a company's costt 
structure,r cture, the costt of  its investedted capital.ital. The effectivenessti enes  with which a companyny 
employsl s its capitalital mustt enterter into an evaluationl ation of  its profitability.bilit . 
2..	 y’s 
Powerer and  Behavioralvioral Theoryry 
Powerr refersf rs to thee abilityi  of  one channelnel memberber to inducee anothert er channelnel memberber to 
changenge its behaviorhavior infavor of thee objectivesj ctives of thee channelnnel memberber exertingerting influence.l ence. 
-Wilemonilemon (1972)972) 
measure-There is a large literatureture in marketingr eting on the definition,fi , dimensions,sions, basesses and asure­
mentt of  power in  channelsl  of  distribution. Althoughlthoug  it is not our intent to provide a 
comprehensiverehensive reviewi  of  thisi  literature,ture, we presentsent a brief discussionsion of  somee key issueses 
which are relevantt to the developmentl p ent of  our measuresasures of  retailertail r versusus manufacturerufacturer mar­
kett power.r. 
The theoreticaloretical foundationstions for much of  the work on channelel powerr lie in the original 
work on powerr by researchersearchers like French and Raven (1959)9) and Emerson (1962).2). French 
r-
and Raven providedd a typologyl  of  five basesses of  powerr while Emerson's dependenceendence frame­
work suggestsgests thatt the dependenceendence of  one partyrty in a dyad providesi s the basisis for the powerr 
of  another,ther, and incorporatesrates alll  the basesses of  powerr within it. 
’s -
StemEl-Ansary- nsar  and rn (1972)2) provided a definitionf  of  powerr which continuesi es to be widely 
“The u deci­acceptedepted in the channelsnels literature:ture: "  ability of a channelnel memberber to controltrol thee ci­
sion variables in the marketingti  strategy of  anotherr memberber in a given channell at a 
different levelel of distribution "(p. 47).). As is clearr from thisi  definition,f  the channelsnels litera-­R r nt ri tion”(p. 
TABLELE 1 
Environmentaliron ental Changes Bases off Powerer Meanss of  Exercisingrcising Power 
Pricingri i  
Storet  Concentrationncentration Reward,r , Coercionercion 
Allowancesll nces 
Orderingr ering Scheduleul  
Deliveryli ry 
Inventoryt ry 
Scannerner Data Expert, Referencef r ce Productr duct Assortmentort ent 
Shelfl  Space Allocationll ation 
Creditr dit 
LoyaltyStoret  lo  Legitimacyle i i  LabelsPrivate la  
Training 
ture examinesi es channell power att the firm-level dyad (individuali  supplierl  versuss channelel 
member),ber), and is bestst suitedi d to empiricaliri l testssts of  firm-level hypotheses,theses, althoughgh its impli­
cationsti s may be extendedtended to industry-leveltr -l l analysesl ses as well.l  
El-Ansary- nsar  and Stem alsol  developedloped a comprehensiver hensive measureasure of  channelnel powerr for such 
firm-levelle  empiricali l analyses.l es. The measuressures assesssess control over 13 marketingr ti  strategytegy 
variables:i l s: inventoryr  policy, orderr size,, pricing, salesl s promotion,ti n, cooperativerative advertising,rtising, 
rn 
distributionti  policies (e.g.,.g., selectivel ctive versusus extensive),tensive), delivery,li ry, credit,it, qualityli  of  installa­ll ­
tion work, salesmen's training,i  salesl s meetings,tings, servicer i  schools,ls, and participationti ti  in the 
activitiesti i i s of  professionalssional associations.sociations. Althoughlt  the specificcifi  measuresasures were weak,k, ass is to 
be expectedcted of  earlyrl  attemptsttempts att operationalization,r tionalization, theyy link the basesses and definitionf  of  
powerr to its applicationli ti  and form the foundationti  for subsequentsequent work on channelel powerr 
l n’s 
measurement.surement. As we wiJI seee in the nextt section,ction, thesese measuresasures enablel  us to relatel te thell 
exercisercise of  powerr to economicic goals.ls. Similarly, Gaski's (1988)8) operationalizationrationalization of  powerr’
encompassedpas ed five activitiesti i i s performedrf r ed by the channelel members-pricing,cing, orderingri  sched­
ule,, inventory,t ry, productt assortment,sortment, and customert er service.rvi e. He too measuressures power ass thee 
d­
extentt nt to which one channelel memberber can influence another's actionsti ns in the realml  of  thesese 
activities.ti iti s. Messinger and Narasimhani n (1995)5) havee frameded the environmentali ntal changesges thatt 
arer  often cited to supportort the contentionntion thatt retailert il r powerr is increasingsi g in the contextxt of  
t er’s 
French and Raven's basesses of  power.r. Table 1 combinesi s thesese with El-Ansary- nsary and Stem's 
measuresasures of  exercisedrcised power.r. 
’  rn’s 
In recentnt years,rs, Emerson's (1962) dependenceendence approachroach hass receivedived a lot of  emphasis.phasis. 
His frameworkork views powerr ass a potentialntial influence,, and is the basissis for much of  thee work 
on potentialti l or unexercisedrci ed power in the channelsls literaturet r  (Frazier,, 1983;3; Gaski and 
Nevin, 1985).85). 
The role of  relativetive performancerf r ance of  the dyad membersbers in thisi  literatureture hass beenn rathert er 
limited.. In examiningi i  performance,rf r ance, channelsels researchersearchers have concernedrned itselfl  more with 
channelnel performancerf ance from the perspectiver pective of  the manufacturerufacturer thann the retailer.tailer. In otherr 
’s  62) 
words,, it examinesines how weJI the channelnel contributesri tes to the performance/profitabilityrf ance/profitabil ty of  thell
supplierli r (Gaski,i, 1984;84; Gaski and Nevin, 1985;5; EI-Ansary and Stem, 1992;92; Kumar,r, Steml-Ansary rn, 
and Achrol, 1992).92). Further,er, profitabilityi  is viewed ass an "outcome" of  the cultivationi  and“ e” 
use of  power (Fraziere  and Summers,rs, 1984;; Boyle,le, Dwyer, Robicheaux and Simpson, 
1992),92), but not ass an indicatorr of  power.r. 
Behavioralavioral Versus  Economicnomic Theory:ry: Bridgingi ging the  Gap  
behav-The above discussionsi  highlightsl ts somee key differencesces betweent en the economico ic and av­
firm­ioral views:: (1) the aggregate,regate, industrytry levell focuss of  the formerr versusus the dyadic,ic, 
levell focus of  the latter;ter; (2)) the differencece betweent en exercisedrcised and potentialntial power;r; (3)) the 
appropriatenessropriateness of  profit ass an indicatorr of  marketrket power.r. We discussss eachch issue below.l . 
Firm Versusrsus Industrytry Levell Analyses 
Botht  firm-levelr -level dyadici  analysesl  and more aggregater gate industry-levelle el analysesl  make 
importantnt contributionsri ti s to the literature.ture. The issue is not which is better,tter, but which is more 
appropriateropriate for testingsting the specificcifi  hypothesestheses in a given study.tudy. Thus, we view thisi  not as 
a disagreementr ement betweent en the two streamsreams of  literatureture but ass a differencece in emphases.phases. Our 
gen­concernr  in thisi  studydy is with the allegedl d shifti  in marketrket powerr from manufacturers,ufacturers, in ­
eral,l, to retailers,tailers, in general,eral, not with specificcifi  pairsi  of  firms.. Consequently,uently, we conductct an 
industrytr  levell analysis.l sis. Dyadic aspectspects of  the powerr balancel ce betweent en individual pairsi  of  
firms willl certainlytainl  provide valuablel  insights aboutt specificcifi  firms,, but such an examinationi ation 
is outsidesi e the scopee of  our study.tudy. 
Exercised Versus Unexercisedr ised Power 
As notedd above,ve, the channelsnels literatureture makeses an importantnt distinctioni  betweent en potentialntial 
power and exercisedrcised power.r. In  contrast,trast, economici  theoryory implicitlyitly concernsrns itself only 
with exercisedrcised powerr and its consequences.quences. In fact,t, the only referencerence to thisi  issue thatt we 
Lemer: “Thewere ablel  to find appearsears in the original work of  rn : "  unusedsed monopolyopoly power will 
be there. but beingi  unknowno n and unusedsed it is. economically,nomically, as if  it werer  not there.ere. Forr 
practicall purposes,, we mustt read monopolyol  power  not as potentialti  monopoly,opoly, but as 
re, , 
monopolyopoly in jorce"(p. 170).0). We believel  it is importantnt to distinguishi i  betweent en potentialntial and 
unexercisedercised powerr and returnrn to thisi  issue in the nextt section.ction. 
f ”  
Profitr fit and  Marketrket Powerer 
This leadss us to the third point of  departurearture betweent en the two views-thee s-the adequacyquacy of  
profitabilityi  ass an indicatorr of  marketrket power.r. Clearly,rl , economico ic theoryory views profitability,ili , 
appropriatelyropriately measured,sured, ass an indicator of  marketr t power.r. However,r, ass notedd above,ve, we 
need measuressures of  both exercisedr i  and potentialti l marketr t power.r. Current profitabilityt ity is 
clearlyl  not a suitablel  measuresure of  potentialtial power-anotherr-another measuresure is needed.ded. Whetherr 
cap-currentt profitabilityi  is a good measureasure of  exercisedrcised powerr dependsends upon how well it ­
turess the meansns throughgh which power is applied.li d. These issuess playa centraltral role in the nextt 
section,ction, wherere we developlop measuresasures of  both exercisedrcised and potentialntial powerr for our indus­
try-levell analysis.l sis. 
-
Assessingssessing Exercisedi ed Marketrket Powerer 
Since the initial  work by Bain nearlyrl  thirtyi  yearsrs ago,o, the costt of  capitalital hass beenn widely 
exam-incorporatedted into the literature,ture, especiallyecial y in finance and accounting.nting. Some recentnt ­
ples of  researcharch addressingr ssing thisi  issue include Felthamt  and Ohlson (1994),), Megnae  and 
Muellereller (1991),), Grabowski  and Vernon (1990),), Ohlson (1994),), Gitmant  and Mercurioe  
(1982),2), Grabowskii and Muellerle  (1978).8). Much more recently,ntly, the importancet nce of  estimatingti ating 
the costt of  capitalital investedt d to generateerate accountingnting profits hass alsol  been recognizednized by prac­
titionersrs and the businessi ss pressss (Stewart,art, 1991;1; Tully, 1993;93; Coca Cola Co. Annual Report,rt, 
1993).93). 
c-
Ass a result,ult, therere is now widespreadread agreementr ement in both the academicdemic literatureture and indus­
try thatt subtractingtracting the costt of  capitalit l employedl d from accountingnting profit providess a bettertter 
“true profitability”.measureasure of  "  i "  This is termedr ed economic,o ic, residual,i al, or abnormalr al profit in the 
academicdemic literaturet t re and Economic Value Added (EVA)) in the businessi ss press.ss. Studiesi s of  
performancerf ance in the marketingr ting literaturet ture have not caughtht up with the importancet nce of  the costt 
of  capital,ital, however,ver, and the two studiesdies by Farris and Ailawadiila a  (1992)2) and Messingerr and 
Narasimhani n (1995)) thatt have examinedi ed the retailtail power shifti  in the food industrytr  are no 
exception.ption. 
We believel  thatt it is particularlyrti l rl  importantnt and usefulf l to include the costt of  capitalital in an 
evaluationl tion of  marketrket powerr of  manufacturersufacturers versusus retailers.tailers. Capitall includess equipment,i ent, 
reall estatetate etc.,tc., which is expectedcted to be productiveti  long afterr it is purchased,ased, as well ass 
working capitalital in cash,sh, inventories,t ri s, receivablesi ables etc.tc. Severalral of  the phenomenaena thatt have 
been cited as evidence of  retailers' growing  power affect componentsts of  capital.i l. For 
instance,ce, the conceptpt of  residuali l profit or EVA  is especiallyecial y consistenti nt with many of  the 
innovationsi  in supplyl  chaini  managementagement hatt focus on the reductionction and inter-channelr- annel shifti  
i ’ 
con-in inventory-carrying coststs and otherr forms of  working capital.i l. Retailersi  arer  very ­
cernedr ed aboutt the amountnt of  capitalital tied up in the productscts theyy sell.l . Two measuresasures of  retailtail 
productivityti it  thatt are increasingsi g in popularityl rit  reflectt thisi  concern.rn. The first is Gross Margin 
self-Return on Inventory Investmentnt (GMROI),OI), the importancence of  inventoryr  in which is lf­
explanatory.l natory. The secondcond is Direct Productt Profitabilityt t  (DPP), which deductsucts from grossss 
marginr i  severaleral coststs incurred in the distributioni ti  process,ess, including a chargerge for inventoryr  
holding.. Further,er, Toys R Us and Wal-Martart have askedked for suppliersli rs to providei  more goodss 
on a consignmenti nt basis,sis, a phenomenonenon thatt hass beenn cited ass one of  the indicatorst rs of  an 
driv­increasese in retailertailer power.r. In fact,t, a focuss on lowering the costt of  capitalital is saidi  to be 
ing many new initiativestiatives in the food industry, such as Efficientficient Consumer Response 
(ECR),), which are designedi d to reducee inventory and lower transactionssactions coststs (Sansolo,l , 
1993).93). According to a recentnt articleti l  (Tully, 1993)93) on the importancet nce of  EVA  to business,i ss, 
“[Tradeloading]
" l i ] damagesages long-termr  returns.t rns. An  importantrt nt reasonon is thatt it demandsands so
 
tempo-po­muchch capital.ital. Pumping up sales requiresires manyy warehousesouses (capital)ital) to hold vastt 
capital)..... problem”rary inventoriesntories (moreore i l)...  Itt took EVA to spotlighttli t thee " (p.. 48).). 
TABLELE 2 
Componentsponents off Economicnomic Value  Addeded 
Elementsle e ts CalculationhJ/ation Measurere 
Sales (5) 5 - COGSS  s Gross  Marginin
._------­
S (GM/5)5 ( S) 
s -0c 
Costt of  Goods  Soldol  (COGS)) 
5 - COGS  OC Returneturn on Sales
Operatingrating Costs  (OC)  
S  (R05) 
s -0c Returneturn on  Investmenttment 
OS) 
S - COGS  OC 
Investedted Capitalit l (lC)I  (ROil 
s-COGS-oc Returneturn on Assets  
IC OI) 
S-COGS-OC 
Totalotal Assets  (TA) 
TA  (ROA)( A) 
Economicc o ic Value  Added
s-COGS-oc-ccS - COGS - OC - CC (EVA)WA)Costt of  Capitalt l (CC) S-COGS-OC-CCs-COGS-oc-cc EVA/SalesN5  
5S (EVNS)VA/S) 
Thus, the explicitl  incorporationr tion of the costt of  capitalital in EVA  hass two advantages.antages. First, 
it countersters a majorj  drawbackack in accountingnting ratestes of  returnt rn ass indicatorst rs of  economicic profit,fi , 
notedd by researchers.earchers. Second,nd, it integratesrates the economicic and behavioralavioral literaturet ture since it 
is directly influencedlue  by some of  the meansns through which retailersil rs can exerciserci e theiri  
allegedd power.r. Thus, it is a more completel te indicatorr of  whetherther or not marketrket powerr hass 
shiftedi  towardsrds retailers.tailers. Table 2 depictspicts the coststs componentsnents thatt arere capturedtured by eachch of  
the traditionaliti al accountingnting measuresasures and EVA.. 
Assessingsse sing Potentialtential Marketrket Powerer 
EVA  capturestures the historicalri l applicationli ti  of  powerr bettertter thann traditionaliti al ratestes of  return.turn. 
However,r, therere is alsol  the questionstion of  whetherther power is beingi  accumulatedulated but not imme­
diatelyl  exercised,rcised, in orderr to preserveserve it for the future.re. Why  mightt retailerstailers not wantt to use 
­
Alderson’s “power principle”,theirir power to increasese profitability?i  One answers er may lie in lde '  " r ", 
which suggestsgests thatt the actionti  chosenen in the currentt situationtion shouldl  be suchh ass to broadenen 
freedomo  of  choicei  in the futurere and avoidi  the risk of  losing powerr by pushingi g it too far.r. 
Professorr Raymond Corey,, in a conversationrsation with one of  the authors,thors, capturedtured thisi  in his 
“if up.”statementtement hatt "  you use power,r, you usee it ." It mightt be thatt retailerstailers arere not exercisingrcisi g 
“use up”.power in the shortrt term so as not to "  it ". One exampleple of  such a strategyr tegy is thatt 
retailerstailers sometimeseti es nurturere smalll  brands.ds. The leadingi  brandsds have morer  distribution,i ti , and,d, 
consequently,quently, theiri  advertisingrti i  is more efficient. Increased distribution can alsol  causee 
inter-retailerr- tailer price competition,etition, makingi  the brand more attractivettractive to consumers.u ers. Over time,, 
somee retailersil rs may try to escapeape the intense price pressuresure typicali l of  widely distributedted 
brandss by trying to nurturere privatete labelsl  or smallerll r competitiveetitive brands.ds. For instance,nce, somee 
buildinging supplyl  companiesi s favored Makitait  power toolsl  over Blacka  & Decker productscts 
when the lattert r were availableil l  in too many outlets.tl ts. By nurturingri  smalll  brands,ds, over whom 
theyey presumablysumably haveve thee greatestr atest power,er, retailerstailers mayy be ablele to preserveserve futurere alterna­
tivesti s versusrsus large,l r e, morere powerfulrful brands.nds. 
Itt mayy alsol  be thatt at retailerstailers suchch ass Wal-Mart,l t, who almostl ost everybodyerybody agreesgrees arere indeedi ed 
gainingi i  power,er, arere strongtrong marketingrketing strategiststrategists who investt in growthr th for long-term- r  success,cces , 
l rna­
andd thet e resultssults of  theirt eir choicei  mayy becomeco e fullyll  apparentparent ini  futuret re ratherther thant n contempo­
raneousous monetarytary returns.turns. In othert r words,, whileil  exercisedrcised marketrket powerr isi  reflectedfl ted ini  
t po­
achievedi ved EVA,, unexercisedxercised marketrket powerr increasesi ases thet e potentialt ntial for futuref t r  EVA.. Fortu­
nately,tely, a measuresure of  thet  potentialt ti l for futuret  EVA  isi  alsol  availableil l  ini  thet  financei  and 
accountingunting literature. We discussi ss itit below.lo .1iterature:We 
There isi  a growingi  streamtream of  financiali i l accountingounting literaturelit ture whichi  revealseals thet e relation­
shipi  betweent een expectedected futuret re EVA  and marketrket value.l e. The classicall sical dividendi i  capitalizationitalization 
modell equatesates marketr t valuel  tot  thet  discountedi t d presentent valuel  of  thet  expectedcted dividendi i  
streamtream (Williams,illia , 1938).38). In recentent years,ars, researcherssearchers haveve drawnn on thist is modelel tot  developvelop 
thet e relationshipl ti nship betweent een marketrket valuel e and expectedected profitfit ini  thet e future,t re, ass wellll ass betweent een 
marketrket valuel  and expectedected residuali ual earningsrnings or EVA  ini  thet e futuret re (seee Stickney,ti ey, 199595 for 
a good overview).rvi ). Peasnellsnell (1981,1982), 82) showss that,t at, ass longl  ass thet e Cleanl  Surplusl  Relationl ti  
(CSR)  ini  accountingnting holds,l s, thet e differencei ce betweent een thet e marketrket valuel  of  a firmi  and itsit  book 
l ti -
valuel  isi  equalal tot  thet e presentsent valuel  of  futuret re expectedected EVA  of  thet e firm. l Recentt theoreticalt oretical 
modelsels of  marketrket valuationti  baseded upon accountingnting information,ti , by researcherssearchers like Ohlson 
(1994),4), Felthamlt  and Ohlsonl  (1994),4), and Fairfieldi i l  (1994),4), furthert er buildil  upon thist i  work.. The 
i .’ 
differencei ce betweent een marketrket and book valuel  isi  termedt r ed "goodwill" ini  thet  literaturelit ture (Peasnell,snell, 
1981,1, Ohlson,l , 1994),4), and hass recentlytl  begun tot  receivei  attentionttention ini  thet  businessi s pressss 
“ ill” 
underr thet e namee Markett Valuel  Added or MVA  (Stewart,t art, 1991;91; Walbert,l rt, 1993).93). Thus:2:2 
Marketet Valuer - Book ValuerMarketr et Value Addedd,r = , l e, 
r= T EVAf  , rI--r (1) 
r=I(1+r)= 2(l+ 
whereere rr =  Discounti unt Ratete 
MVA  servesrves as an indicatorr of  marketrket power which is beingi  accumulatedulated for futurere earn­
ings.. Iff retailerstailers have indeedd been increasingsi g theirir marketrket powerr and thereforerefore theirir abilityi  
to increasese EVA  in the future,re, then efficient capitalital marketsrkets shouldl  recognizenize thisi  potentialntial 
m­
for futurere earningsr i s and marketrket participantsrti i ants shouldl  incorporaterate thisi  knowledge in theiri  val­
uationti  of  retailers.tailers. Thus, we expectct an increasese in marketrket powerr which may not have been 
exercisedrcised yet,, but holds the potentialtial for future increasesses in EVA,, to be reflectedted in higherr 
MVA.. 
Two points deserveerve mentionti  aboutt MVA.. The first is its advantagentage over ratioi  measuressures 
l
such as MarketIBook ratiosi s in thatt it representsr sents the amountt of wealthlt  thatt a firm is expectedcted/
to create.te. Thus, firms thatt grow theiri  investmentsents effectivelyi l  for future EVA  (e.g.,., Wal­-
Mart)a  willll have higherr MVAss while theiri  MarketIBook ratiosi s stayy steadyady or even decline.l . 
Off course,, growth per se should not and doess not increase MVA.. Iff additionali l capitall 
investedt d by the firm doess not bring future earningsr i s in excessss of  the costt of  the capitali l (i.e.,, 
positive futurere EVA),), then the marketr t value of  thatt capitali l willl be equall to its book value 
(Stewart,rt, 1991;1; Stickney,, 1995).5). Consequently,ntly, MVA  willll remaini  unchanged.ed. In  otherr 
/
words,, growth in investmentsnts willl increasee MVA  only iff the investmentsnts are effectivelyi l  
made in thatt they are expectedcted to bring positive future EVA.. 
The secondd point is a caveateat which recognizesi s thatt the markett efficiency hypothesisesis is 
controversial.i l  Off the three forms of  the market efficiencyicienc  hypothesis,sis, the weak-form 
(which statestes thatt capitalital marketsr ets fully  incorporater te the informationi  in  pastt stock prices)s) and 
semi-strongi- trong form (which sayss thatt capitali l marketsr ets fully incorporatete all publicly  availableil l  
information)i  have plenty of  empiricali i l support.ort. The strongg form (which statestes thatt all infor­
mationi  is incorporated,ted, public or private)) doess not seem to be widely  substantiatedtantiated by 
empiricali i l evidencee (Ross,, Westerfieldrfi ld and Jaffe, 1993).3). Informationr  aboutt marketr t power 
of  retailersil rs versuss manufacturersfacturers can be consideredi red public thuss making the less question­ti n­
ablel  semistrong form applicable.li ble. However,r, as noted by a reviewer,i er, itt is possiblei l  for marketr ti trong 
participantsti i nts to be influencedl  by "street talk" aboutt the power shift.i . Itt is importantnt to bearr 
thisi  caveatat in mind.. 
“ et l ” 
Summary:ary: Marketrket Powerer and  Performancerformance 
In  thisi  section,tion, we have provided an overviewr i  of  the channelsnels and economicic literaturet ture on 
the subjectj ct of  powerr and attemptedtempted to integraterate them in our conceptualptual frameworkork and the 
developmentl ent of  our measures.asures. Economic Value Added is a measuresure of  historicalri l perfor­
mancece which reflectsts exercisedrcised powerr more completelyl tely thann do accountingnting ratestes of  return.t rn. 
Marketa  Value Added is a forward-lookingin  measuresure thatt assessesesses EVA  expectedcted in the 
futurere as a resultlt of  potentialntial powerr thatt may not yet have been exercised.rcised. 
Table 3 summarizesari s thisi  discussion by integratingti  the marketingr ti  strategytegy variables 
rf r­
throughh which retailerst il rs can accumulateul te and exercisercise power (seee Stem and EI-Ansary, 
1972;72; Gaski,i, 1988)88) with thee correspondingsponding componentsonents of  EVA  and MVA  on which theyy 
rn l- nsar , 
would have thee biggestst impact.ct. For instance,nce, retailerstailers can wield theirir powerr overr manufac­
turersrers by negotiatingtiating lower pricess and tradede allowancesl es from them,, thee impactt of  which 
shoulduld be seenn in relativel ti  Gross Margins and Advertising & Promotioni  expenses.enses. They 
shouldl  be ablel  to reducece theiri  inventory and administrativei i trative coststs eitheri r by transferringsferring 
them to manufacturersufacturers or by reducingci g totaltal systemtem coststs throughr ugh bettertter informationti  use and 
ufac­
categorytegory managementagement and techniqueshniques suchh ass JITIT etc.3 The extenttent to which theyy arere ablel  totc.3 
differentiatetiate themselvesselves throughr ugh bettertter informed and skilled managersnagers and successfulces ful pri­
vatete labeling shouldl  improve theiri  future profit makingi  potential,ntial, and thereforerefore theiri  
marketrket value.l e. 
i-
MEASUREMENTSUREMENT OF  VARIABLESI LES FOR  EMPIRICALIRICAL ANALYSISYSIS 
We use financialfi i l datata forf r thet e periodri  1982-1992 fromfr  thet e COMPUSTATSTAT andd Universityi r it  off 
Chicagoi  CRSP  databasestabases for our empiricalpiri al analyses.alyses. The Standardt ndard Industrytry Classificationl i i ti  
codingi  manualual wass usedd tot  categorizetegorize companiesanies withit  specificecific SIC  codeses intoi t  variousri s 
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TABLEBLE 3 
The Performance Impact of  Marketingti g Activitiest iti  
Marketingeting Activitiesities Affectedf t  Componentsts 
Pricingricing 
Privaterivate labelsl  
Allowancesl c  
Orderingring Schedulec le 
Deliverylivery 
Shelfhelf Spacep  
Inventoryntory 
Productroduct Assortmentsortment 
(Category Mgmt)t) 
Creditit 
Trainingraining 
Scannerc r Informationformation 
Privaterivate Labels  
Gross  Margin/Salesales 
Advertisingtising & Promotion/romotion/ 
Sales 
SG&#Sales&NSales 
ROS  
Inventory/Salest y/ ales 
ROA  
EVA 
Managementent Skillski ls 
Stocktoc  Priceric  
MVA  
Expectedxpect  Impact off Relativel t  Marketet Poweri  
manufac-Retailerst l  shouldould negotiate lower  prices  from  f ­
turers,s, thus  increasinging theirir GM/S,, but  onlyl  if  they  do  
nott correspondinglypondingly lower  theirir sellingling prices  (which  
some  retailers  do  as a deliberaterate competitivetitive strategy).t t  
mar-Privaterivat  labelsl  shouldould alsol  increase  retailerl r gross  ­
gins.. 
Retailerst l  shouldould negotiate increased  trade  allowances  
from  manufacturers,rs, thus  increasinging manufacturerf ct rer 
A&P/S./ . 
Retailerst l  shouldould negotiate more  favorable terms  that  
transferfer such administrativeistrative overheads  to  manufactur­f t r­
%X&A/Sers,, thus  decreasingi g theirir SG NS and increasinging theirr 
ROS.. 
Retailerst l  shouldould eitherr transferfer inventorytory carryingi g costs  
I/S,to  manufacturers,rs, thus  decreasingr i  theirir 1/5, or  systemste  
JITlike  EDI,I, )  etc. shouldould reduce total systemte  costs,, 
I/Sdecreasingi g 1/5 for  both manufacturersers and retailers.. 
Retailerst  shouldould negotiate more  favorable creditit terms  
whichi  reduce  theirir administrativeistrative costs and reduce 
theirir costt of  workinging capital,i l  thus  increasinging EVA. 
Bettertter trainingi ing and improvedoved informationf rmation systemste s 
shouldould improveove managementt skill,i l, thus  increasinging the  
potentiall of  retailers  for  long term  profitability,t lity, and 
thereforefore higher  MVA.. Successfuluc ful privatet  labelsl  
shouldould reduce  dependence  on  manufacturersf ers and 
increase  potentiall for  futuret re profit.fit. 
A-lindustries.tries. Our sampleple containst i s 909 manufacturersufacturers and 274 retailers.tailers. Table -I in thee 
appendixendix lists the SICs included in eachch industry.stry. 
Alonglong with EVA  and MVA,, we alsol  analyzel  Gross Margin/Sales (GM/S),/ ), Advertising 
& Promotion/Salesti / ales (A&P/S),P/S), Selling, Generalral & Administrativei  Expenses/Salesses/Sales (SG&A// 
Inven-S), Return on Salesl s (ROS), Return on Assetss (ROA),), Return on Investmentent (ROI)) and ­
tory/Sales/ les (I/S). As shown in Table 1,, somee of thesese variablesi l s arere logically priorcomponentsnents 
of  the others.ers. For  example,ple, a measureasure like EVA/Sales/Sale  is calculatedl l ted ass GM/S/  minus variousi s 
operatingrating coststs like SG&A/S/S and A&P/S,P/S, and a chargerge for capital,ital, one componentnent of  which 
is Inventory.t ry. Therefore,f re, examiningi i  the componentsents and the compositeosite measuresasures is more 
informativeti  thann only consideringi ri  trendsds in, say,y, EVA  and MVA.. EVA/S/  might exhibiti i  a 
decreasingreasing trendd becauseuse GM/S/  decreasedreased and the otherr costt componentsonents did not decreasecrease 
enoughgh to offsett thee loss of  margin,r i , or it mightt increasese due to higherr operatingrating costs,ts, despitespite 
an increasese in GM/S./ . Trendss in componentsents helpl  us understandrstand which of  thesese and otherr 
alternativel rnative explanationsl ations is valid.l . This is particularlyrti l rly importanttant in the contexttext of  our analysisl sis 
since giantt retailerstailers like Wal-Marta  arere saidi  to be lowering theirir sellingl  pricess and thereforerefore 
Sirni-m ­theirir grossss marginsrgins ass a deliberateli rate strategy,rategy, while keepingi g theirir operatingrating coststs low.. 
larly,l , the componentsents can show the full impactt of  increasedsed salesl s promotionti  both in the 
potentialntial lowering of manufacturerufacturergrosss marginsrgins vis a vis retailerstailers and the potentialntial increasese 
retailer’sin the il r's costt of inventoryr duetoforwardr  buying.. Thus, weexaminei e trendsds in the meann 
valuesl s of  alll  thesese variablesi l s for retailerstailers and manufacturersufacturers in eachch industry.stry. Means of  alll  
the ratioti  variablesi l s are weightedted by theirir denominator.o inator. Thus,, variablesi l s like GM/S,/ , A&P/S,/S, 
and ROS  are weightedd by Sales,, ROA  is weighted by Assetss  and ROII is weighted by 
Investment.ent. 
Measurementurement of  Economico ic and Marketket Value  Added  
Whilele alll  otherr variablesi l s are self-explanatory,l l natory, our measuresasures of  EVA  and MVA  requireir  
explanation.l nation. 
Economicno ic Valued Added  
Capitall consistsi ts of  two parts,rts, debtt and equity.uity. The costt of  debtt (botht  long termr  and shortrt 
term)r ) is approximatedroxi ated by interestst expensense adjustedj ted for its tax deductibility.4uctibility.4 We use the 
Capitall Assets  Pricing Model to obtaini  the risk adjustedj sted ratete att which costt of  equityity mustt be 
calculated:5l l ted:5 
r = Risk Freee Ratete + Pp ( AverageAverage Stockock Returnturn - Risk Freee (2)( )Rate)te)  
“beginning year”Ann annualal " i i  of  r" Pb isis calculatedl l ted for eachch COMPUSTATP STAT firm in our sampleple 
previ­for which monthlyt l  stockck returnst rns are availableil l  on the CRSP  databasetabase for att leastst thee i­
i’th r’thous threer e years.rs. Fivee yearsrs of  datata are usedd wherere available.il le. B for thee ' firm in the t't  
yearr is estimatedti ated as:s: 
covarianceariance (R i , R ), ,)m 
= (3)(3)PitPit = varianceriance )(R,)m 
Rj i’th R,wherere ; representsresents the monthlyt l  returnst rns for the ' firm over the previousi s 3-5 yearsrs and m 
representsresents the monthlyt l  returnr  for the marketr t ass a whole overr the samee time period.ri . For  
firms whose Pp isis not available,il le, we use the averagerage of  the industrytr  and channelnel to which thatt 
firm belongs.l s. 
We use thee averagerage returnt rn on the I-year Treasuryury Billl ass the risk-free ratete for our analy­l-ye l ­
sis of  yearlyrl  data.ta. Since the intermediater ediate termr  equityit  risk premiumi  is approximatelyroxi ately 7.5 %.  
1(SBBII 19944 Yearbook,e ok, Ibbotson Associates),tes), Equationi  I simplifiesl  to:: 
1 p(7.5%) (4)( )r = I Yearr T.Bill Ratete + P .5%) 
The costt of  equityity is simplyl  the book value of  common equityit  timess thisi  ratete "r". EVA  is 
calculatedl l ted as Net Income Afterft  Interestst Expensee and Taxess but beforef r  Extraordinaryr i ary Itemss 
minus the abovee Cost of  Equity.. 
“ ”
Marketrk  Value Addedded 
The calculationl l ti  of  MVA  is relativelyl ti l  straightforward:raightforward: 
MVA = Market Value of  Equity - Book Value of  Equity (5)( ) 
The marketrket value of  equityit  is calculatedl l ted ass the productct of  sharere price att the close of  eachch 
fiscall yearr and the numberr of  common sharesres outstandingtanding att thatt time.. 
Dollarlar and Ratio Measures 
Note thatt we use two EVA  basedsed measuresasures in our analysis-Dollaris-Dollar EVA  and EVA  as a 
percentager entage of  Sales.l s. The latterr correctscts ROS for the costt of  capital,ital, while preservingerving its 
ratioti  view.. However,r, Dollarlar EVA  providess us with information aboutt the "value" beingi  
createdted by a firm, thatt thee ratiosti s may obscure.cure. For example,ple, consideri r thatt it is quitei  possiblei l  
for a companyny whose salesl s are falling everyry yearr and thatt hass almostt beenn forcedd out of  the 
market,rket, to havee a ratete of  returnrn that:at: (1) staysys steadyady over time;; and (2)) is comparablearable to thatt 
of  a high-growthr th competitoretitor with a majorj  sharere of  thee market.rket. On the otherr hand,d, Dollar 
“ ” 
EVA  for the two companiesnies would be quitei  differentt ass would its valuel  for the dying com­
pany over time.. We believel  thatt importantnt ass ratiosti s are,re, it is alsol  importantnt to be ablel  to 
distinguishi  betweent en scenariosnarios such ass the two describedscribed above.ve. Similarly, ratiosti s may not 
fairly representresent the effectivenessti nes  of  companiesnies thatt arer  investingi  stronglyr gly in growthth andd 
thereforerefore have stablebl  or even decliningl  profit ratios.ti s. Trends in the Dollarlar EVA  of  such 
companiesnies willl show whetherther theirir investmentst ents have beenn wisely madede in thatt theyy earnrn 
more thann the costt of  the capitalital invested.ted. 
-
RESULTSLTS 
In thisi  section,ction, we presentsent the resultsults of  our empiricaliri l analysisl sis startingrting with an aggregateregate 
view of  alll  manufacturersufacturers vis a vis alll  retailers,tailers, acrossross thesese industries.tries. Table 4 presentssents 
trendd regressionression coefficientsf ts for severaleral of  our performancerf r ance measures,asures, while Figures 1 and 
2 depictict relativel ti e trendsnds in EVA  and MVA  for manufacturersufacturers and retailers.tailers. Recallll thatt alll  
ratioti  measuresasures arer  weightedted by theirir denominator.o inator. 
The datata suggestgest thatt retailerstailers arer  not significantly bettertter off  comparedared to manufacturersufacturers 
signifi­on any of  the performancerf r ance measures.asures. Retaileril r EVA  and MVA  have increasedsed att a i
cantlytl  slowerr ratete thann manufacturers.ufacturers. These resultsults certainlytainl  do not supportport thee contentionntion 
thatt retailers,tailers, in general,eral, have increasedsed theirir powerr relativeti  to manufacturers.ufacturers. 
Of  course,e, such an aggregateregate view may hide differencess acrossr ss industriesi  and retailil 
classes.ses. We now examinei e individual industriestri s and retailtail classes.ses. Our findings,, discussedssed 
below,l , providei  interestingr sting insightss thatt arer  not availableil l  from an analysisl sis of  only a singlel  
industrytry (Farrisi  and Ailawadi,ila a , 1992;92; Messingerr and Narasimhan,i han, 1995).6Q6 
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TABLEABLE 4 
Trend Regressionion Coefficientsficients for  Entiretir  Samplele (1982-1992)d l  
Measurere All Manufacturersf cturers All Retailerst il r// // 
0.60' -0.06"Grossss Margin/Salesa gin/Sales (GM/S/  %) 0.60’ -0.06** 
(0.09)(0.09) (0.04)(0.04) 
Returneturn on Salese  (ROS  %) -0.08' -0.13'-0.08* -0.13* 
(0.04)(0.04) (0.02)(0.02) 
Returneturn on Assetssets (ROA  %) -0.30' -0.28'-0.30’ -0.28* 
(0.04)(0.04) (0.04)(0.04) 
Returneturn on Investmentestment (ROI  %) -0.34' -0047'-0.34’ -0.47* 
(0.07)(0.07) (0.08)(0.08) 
Economicc o ic Valuealue Addeddded (EVA $mill)ll) 2.14' -0.06- .062.14* 
(0.61)(0.61) (0042) 
E\A/Sales\NS  (EVA/S 0.13' 
(0.42) 
N %) 0.13* 0.00. 0 
(0.04)(0.04) (0.03)(0.03) 
Marketarket Valuealue Addeddded (MVA  $milllB ll) 94.34'94.34* 38.14'38.14* 
(8044)(8.44) (5.89)(5.89) 
Inventory/Salese tory/Sales (1/5 %) -0.32'l/S -0.32’ 0.03. 3 
(0.06)(0.06) (0.06)(0.06) 
SG&NSales (SGNS&A/Sales AI  %) 0046'0.46* -0.02- .02 
(0.08)(0.08) (0.03)(0.03)
 
Advtgtg &  Promotion/Salesro otion/Sales (A&P/SP/  %) -0.1 o** -0.04*
- .10" -0.04' 
(0.05)(0.05) (0.01)(0.01) 
Notes: Standard errorsr  arer  in parentheses+dar  r fit ses 
• Significantatpig ificantat  =  ..0.05;. ;  Significantatpig ificantat  =  0.10.  
TABLEABLE 5 
Trend  Regressionion Coefficientsfficients for  Food  Industrystry (1982-1992)l  
Measurere Manufacturersf t rers Retailerst il r  
1.03' 0.24'Grosss Margin/Salesa gin/Sales (GM/S/  %) 1.03* 0.24* 
(0.22)(0.22) (0.03)(0.03) 
Returneturn on  Sales (ROS  %) 0.15% -0.12*.15' -0.12' 
(0.02)(0.02) (0.03)(0.03) 
Returneturn on  Assetssets (ROA  %) -0.01- .01 -0.57'-0.57* 
(0.04)(0.04) (0.12)(0.12) 
Returneturn on  Investmentvestment (ROII %) 0.05. 5 -0.92'-0.92* 
(0.07)(0.07) (0.19)(0.19) 
Economicc o ic Valuea ue Addeddded (EVA  $millll ) 9.11' -0.12- .129.11* 
(1047)(I . ) (0.83)(0.83) 
EVA/Sales (EVA/SN a e  N  %) 0.27' -0.000.27* -0.00 
(0.06)(0.06) (0.02)(0.02) 
252.73* 60.04'60.04*Marketarket Valuea ue Addeddded (MVA  $mill)l) 2.73' 
(20.69)(20.69) (12.34)(12.34) 
Inventory/Sales (1/5 %) -0040' 0.01.i ve tory/Sales I S -0.40* 
(0.04)(0.04) (0.03)(0.03) 
SG&NSales (SGNSSC&A/Sales %) 0.71' 0.10'0.71* 0.10* 
(0.21)(0.21) (0.35)(0.35) 
Advtgt  &  Promotion/Salesro otion/Sales (A&P/SP/  %) -0.03.03 -0.02'-0.02* 
(0.02)(0.02) (0.01)(0.01) 
Notes:otes: ermrsStandardrd rro  arer  in parenthesesr ntheses 
• Significantatp = 0.05; .. Significantatp = 0.10.* ig ificantat .05; ** ig ificantat  
Analysisl is of  the Food  Industrytry 
First,, we presentsent resultssults for thee food industry,stry, whichi  hass beenen analyzedalyzed by bothth Farrisri  
and Ailawadiila a  (1992)2) andd Messingerr and Narasimhani han (1995).95). Tablel  5 summarizesarizes trendsnds 
for food manufacturersnufacturers andd groceryery retailers.tailers. 
Our analysisalysis validatesl tes thee resultssults reportedorted by thee earlierrli r studiestudies for Gross Margin, ROS, 
ROA  and ROI.. These traditionali i l ratestes of  returnt r  have eitheri r increasedsed significantlyica t  or 
remainedained stabletable for manufacturers,nufacturers, whereasreas theyy haveve eitheri er increasedsed att a much slowerl r 
ratete (e.g..g. Gross Margin/Sales),l s), or declinedcli d significantlyi i tl  for retailers.tailers. 
As shown in Figures 3 and 4,, accountingti g for the costt of  capitalital doess not reverserse the 
trendsnds reportedorted by thee previousvi s two studies,tudies, and nor doeses an examinationination of theirir potentialt ntial 
for futurere earnings.rnings. Food manufacturersnufacturers haveve beenen ablel  to improve theireir EVA  att thee ratete of 
approximatelyproxi ately $9 millioni io  perr year,ar, while EVA  for grocerycery retailerstailers hass shownn no change.nge. 
Similarly, food manufacturersufacturers haveve increasedased theirir goodwillill att thee ratete of $25353 millionion perr 
yearr while the correspondingsponding ratete for groceryery retailerstailers is only $60 millionion perr year.ar. We find 
no evidencei ce for an increasese in the powerr exercisedrcised or accumulatedulated for the future,re, by gro­
ceryr  retailers.tailers. 
The datata alsol  show thatat althoughl ugh food retailerstailers haveve heldl  theirir inventory/salestory/sales ratioti  fairly 
steadyady or increasedsed it slightly,l tl , food manufacturersnufacturers havee donee better-theirt ir inventory/salestory/sales 
ratiosti s have significantly decreased.creased. One of  thee strategiesrategies employedl d by manufacturersufacturers to 
increase theiri  EVA  hass been the reductioni  of  working  capitali l tied up in inventories, 
whereas,reas, contrarytrary to widespreadread beliefs,li f , food retailerstail rs appearear not to havee accomplishedplished 
thisi  reduction.ti . Finally,ly, manufacturerf cturer spendingi  on SG&A  ass a percentager ntage of  Salesl  hass 
­
increasedsed much fasterter thann retailertail r spending,nding, but the former's grossss marginsrgins havee clearlyrl  
increasedsed fasterter than SG&AlS,AlS, in the food industry.try. 
Iff performance,rf r ance, both presentent and potential,ntial, of  food retailerstailers hass beenn decliningl  relativeti  
to food manufacturersufacturers and thisi  declineli  is not sensitivesitive to the measuresure of  performancerf ance used,d, 
why is the press,ss, both businessi ss and academic,demic, so adamantant aboutt increasingsing retailtail power?r? 
Has thisi  shifti  occurredrred in non-food industries?tri s? 
r’s 
Analysisl sis of  Remainingaining Industriesstries 
We analyzedl d trendsds in eachch measuresure for thirteenen otherr consumerer good industries.tries. Table 
6 summarizesarizes the key findings from this analysis.l i . Detailsi  of  the trend regressionssion coeffi­
cients for manufacturersf cturers and retailersil rs in each industry are provided in Table A-2-2 of  the 
Appendix.p  
f -
Accountingcounting Rates off Return and  Economiccono ic Value Addeddded 
Manufacturera r r grosss marginsr i s have been improving at a ratete thatt is significantly fasterter than 
thatt for retailersil rs in all 13 industries.tri s. Retaileri  ROS hass improved relativei  to manufacturerf cturer 
ROS  only in the computerter industry,try, wherere a few large manufacturersfacturers like IBM  and DEC  
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TABLE 6 
MANUFACTURERSAC URERST  VERSUSSUS RETAILERS:AILERS: SUMMARYARY OF  RESULTS*S TS*L  
industries 	 Industries witht  Specialtyi ltyc a  Retailerst  Bettertt  offff Relativel t  to Manufacturersf ct rersuI i with  Retailerst  Bettert  offff Relativel t  to Manufacturersf ct rersu  i 
 
(Total = 13)
rota/  (Total = 8)
 
Measuresurea  Numberre  industriesI 	 Numbererb  Industriest 
 
CMIS
/S o0 0o
 
ROS  1 Computersputers 0o
 
ROA  0 2 Audion/ideo 
o Appliances,ppliances, udioNideo
 
ROI  0o 0o
 
EVA 1 Computersputers 1 Computersputers
 
EVAiS 1
1N 
  Computersputers Computersputers
 
MVA  9” 	 All exceptt Appliances;liances; Drugs; Toiletries;letrie ;i s  and  Tobaccobacco 3 Apparel,ar l,pp e  Computers,uters,p  Toy 
g@
 
1/5 o0 	 1 Appliancesliancespp  
SC&AiS 8a 	 All exceptt Appliances;liances; Furniture;t r ;i e  Jewelry;lr ;e y  Officefice 5 All exceptt Appliances;liances; Footwear;t ear; and  Furnitureit reu  
I/S 
NS 
Machines;achines; and Woodood	 
7	 Audio/Video; All exceptt AudioNideo; Computers;puters; Furniture;t r ;i eudio/Video; andA&P/SP/S	 All exceptt Appliances;liances; udioNideo; Drugs; Officefice 4
 
Machines;achines; Tobacco;acco; and  Toys Toys
 
• Generalral Merchandisersc andisers are includedludedi  ini  the retailert iler sampleple for  9 industries.stries.iNotes:t s: * 	 
Eliminatingliminating Wal-Mart from  the sampleple reduces  thisi  numberber to 3.	@ &Mart 
havee suffered.ff red. The samee is truee of  both EVA  and the ratioti  of  EVA/Sales./Sale  The evidencei ce is 
clearlyrl  not consistenti tent with a generaleral increasese in powerr exercisedrcised by retailers.tailers. 
Marketarket Valuelue Addeddded 
Interestingly,stingly, retailersil rs performf  much bettertter on the marketr t baseded measuresure usedd in our 
analysis.lysis. Their MVA  hass increasedsed att a significantly fasterter ratete thann manufacturersufacturers in 9 of  
the 133 industries.tries. It would seeme  thatt the potentialntial powerr of  retailers,tailers, ass perceivedr eived by the 
market,rket, hass increasedsed in severaleral industries.tries. 
A  closerr look revealsals that,t, exceptpt for Appliances,ia , the remainingi i  threeree industriestri s wherere 
retaileril r MVA  hass not improved relativei  to manufacturersf cturers are servedr ed mainlyi  by groceryry 
retailers---drugs, toiletriesri s and tobaccocco products.cts. On the otherr hand,d, 8 of  the 9 industriestri s 
wherere retailertail r MVA  hass improved fasterter thann manufacturerufacturer MVA,, arer  served,rved, apartrt from 
il rsdrugs, 
specialtycialty retailers,tailers, by threeree groupss of  retailtail stores,res, who we referr to as Generalral Merchandis­
ers in the remainderi  of  this paper:r: Variety (5331),), General Merchandisee  (5399)) and 
is-
Departmentrt ent (5311) Stores.res. 1) 
Separatingarating Outt The  Effectt off Generaleral Merchandisershandisers 
“specialty”There arer  eightt industriesri  in our sampleple whose productscts arer  soldl  both by " ci lt " 
retailerstailers and thesese generaleral merchandisers.rchandisers. In orderr to determineter ine the extenttent to which the per­
formancence of  retailerstailers is influenced by the latter,ter, we alsol  conductedcted the analysesl ses for only the 
r-
specialtycialty retailerstailers (excludingl i  SICss 5311, 5331, and 5399).9). The lastt two columns of  Table 
6 summarizearize thisi  analysis,l sis, while Table A-2-2 providess the detailedtailed resultslts for eachch of  the 
eighti t industries.tries. Overall,ll  our earlierrli r conclusionsi  aboutt exercisedrcised powerr remaini  unchanged.anged. 
 1, 533 1, 
There arer  minor differencesces in somee performancerf r ance measuresasures like SG&A/S/S and ROA.. How­
ever,r, the mostt notablel  differencee is in MVA  trends.ds. As we suspected,pected, conclusionsi  aboutt 
-
potentialntial power,r, baseded on MVA,, do dependend substantiallystantially on whetherther or not generaleral mer­
chandisersdisers arere included.. We find that,t, once generaleral merchandisersrchandisers arere excluded,l ed, retailerstailers 
r­
merchan­arere bettertter off  relativel ti e to manufacturersufacturers in only threeree industries.tries. Clearly,rl , generaleral rchan­
disersrs do havee a big impactt on MVA  trendsnds for retailers.tailers. Clearly,rl , the marketrket perceivesrceives an 
increasese in thee powerr of  certainrtain classesses of  retailerstailers but not others.ers. 
A  Comparisonparison of  Variouss Retailert iler Classeslasses 
In orderr to gett a bettert r understandingr tanding of  such differences,s, we now examinei  various 
classesses of  retailers.tailers. 
Groceryrocery Retailersilers versuss Generaleneral Merchandiserserchandisers 
merchan-The first comparisonarison thatt is calledl  for is betweent en groceryery retailerstailers and generaleral rchan­
disers,rs, since it is clear thatt groceryry retailersil rs have not improved theiri  position vis a vis 
manufacturersufacturers while generaleral merchandisersrchandisers have.e. The first two rows of  Table 7 comparesares 
trendsnds in alll  measuresasures for thesese two classesses of  retailers.tailers. 
retail-Some interestingr sting differencesnces arer  apparentarent betweent en the two retailtail classes.ses. Grocery tail­
erss are bettertter off  relativel ti  to generaleral merchandisersrchandisers on Gross Margin but both classesses havee 
heldl  theirir EVA  fairly steady.teady. This is becauseause generaleral merchandisersrchandisers havee alsol  reduceduced theirir 
SG&A/SalesInventory/Sales,r / les, N ales and Advertising &  Promotion/Salesti / ales att a significantly higherr 
rate.te. Further,r, generaleral merchandisersrchandisers have increasedsed theirir MVA  att an averagerage ratete of  $15151 
millionion perr year,r, while MVA  for groceryery retailerstailers hass increasedsed only att a thirdi  of  thatt rate,te, 
low-att $60 millionion perr year.ar. These findings suggestgest that:at: (1)) generaleral merchandisersrchandisers have ­
eredd theirir grossss marginsrgins but havee beenn ablel  to survivei  by lowering theirir operatingrating coststs and 
mer-coststs of  capital;ital; and (2) the marketrket perceivesrceives a higherr potentialntial for powerr in generaleral r­
chandisersi ers comparedred with the traditionali i l supermarketr arket channel.el. These findings are alsol  
consistenti nt with the impactt of  generaleral merchandisersrchandisers on the MVA  trendsnds we observedrved for 9 
industriestri s in the previousi s section.ction. 
SpecialtyCi lty Retailers versus General  Merchandisersrchandisers 
In recentnt years,rs, somee of  the discussionsi  aboutt retailingili  phenomenao ena hass centeredtered aroundd 
the re-emergenceergence of  specialtycialty retailerst il rs (Bates,s, 1989;89; Wilson,ls  1993).3). For  instance,ce, Batess 
predictedi ted thatt the "strategic pendulumndulum will move  backck into the specialtycialty store  arena", andd“ t gic na”, 
“the stores”"  nextxt two decadesades coulduld welll be  dominatedinated by new formsrms off specialtycialty s" (p.. 383).). 
rel-We thereforerefore examineine the datata to seee how specialtycialty retailers,tailers, on the whole,l , havee faredd l­
ativei  to generalral merchandisers.rchandisers. The thirdi  row of  Table 7 showss that,t, ass in the previousi  
comparison,arison, Gross Margin hass decreasedcreased fasterter for generaleral merchandisers,rchandisers, but therere is no 
significant differencece in ROS or EVA  trendsnds betweent een the two groups.ps. MVA  for the generaleral 
class,s, on the otherr hand,d, hass increasedsed much fasterter thann for the specialtycialty retailers.tailers. Finally, 
reduc­althoughl ugh therere is no significant differencece in the ratete att which both classesses havee beenn c­
ing theirir SG&NSales and Advertising &  Promotion/Sales,ti /Sales, specialtycialty retailerstailers have,e, unlike 
generalral merchandisers,r handisers, not beenn ablel  to decreaserease theiri  Inventory/Salesl  ratios.ti s. Nor have 
A/ ales 
theirir SG&NSales ratiosti s declinedli d att ass a high a rate.te. This is nott surprisingri i  consideringi ri g thatt 
productt line assortmentsortment and servicervi e are somee of  the advantagesntages thatt specialtyci lty storesres arere 
expectedected to provide.i e. 
Thus, therere are significant differenceses betweent en variousi  retaileril r classeses in termsr s of  the 
A/ ales 
market's perceptionr eption of  theirir potentialntial power,r, even thoughgh exercisedrcised power,r, ass evidencedi ced by 
EVA  is not very different.t. Before concluding thatt generaleral merchandisersrchandisers have increasedsed 
theirir powerr relativel ti e to specialtycialty and groceryery retailers,tailers, we takee a closerr look att the groupp of  
generaleral merchandisers,rchandisers, specificallycifi l  the impactt of  one firm which is known to have gainedi d 
powerr in recentnt years-Wal-Mart.al- art. 
r t’s 
Generaleral Merchandiserse c is  Excluding Wal-Martart 
The fourthth row of  Table 7 depictsicts trendsnds in the generaleral merchandiserrchandiser groupp afterr exclud­
ing Wal-Martart from the sample.pl . Althoughlthou  the exclusion of  Wal-Martart doess not have a 
l ­
TABLE 7 
A  Comparisonparison of  Trends  for Differentferentf  Retail  Classes  
Retaileriler Classs  CM/SG IS ROS  ROA  ROII EVA EVAIS!  MVAA l/S115 So\/5GA/S A&P/SI  
Food  0.24*.24' -0.12’.12' -0.57*.57' -0.92*.92' -0.12.12 -0.00. 0 60.05*.05' 0.011.  0.10’.10' -0.03.03 
(0.03).03) (0.02).02) (0.12).12) (0.19).19) (0.83).83) (0.03).03) (12.34)2.34) (0.03).03) (0.03).03) (0.01). 1 ) 
Generalnerale  Merchandiserserchandisers -0.38*.38' -0.15*.15' -0.22*. 2' -0.36*.36' -1.93.93 -0.01.01 151.50*1.50' -0.15.15 -0.19*.19' -0.08’.08' 
(0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.04).04) (0.10).10) (1.68).68) (0.05).05) (19.96)9.96) (0.10).10) (0.06).06) (0.02).02) 
Specialtyialty -0.01.Q1 -0.18*.18' -0.37*.37' -0.49*.49' 0.07.07 0.04.04 15.29*.29' -0.01.01 0.111 -0.03*.03' 
(0.09).09) (0.04).04) (0.07).07) (0.10).10) (0.15).15) (0.03).03) (4.26).26) (0.07).07) (0.07).07) (0.01).01) 
Generalnerale  Merchandiserserchandisers -0.38*.38' -0.17*.17' -0.24*.24' -0.43’.43' -3.38*.38' -0.06*’.06" 44.30*.30'4  -0.22**. 2" -0.21*.21 ' -0.04’.04' 
exceptcept Wal-Martal-Mart (0.07).07) (0.04).04) (0.04).04) (0.09).09) (1.28).28) (0.04).04) (11.34)1.34) (0.12).12) (0.06).06) (0.02).02) 
Wal-Martal-Mart -0.68*.68' 
(0.04).04) 
-0.02.02 
(0.02).02) 
-0.05.05 
(0.12).12) 
0.011 
(0.20).20) 
83.69*.69' 
(13.00)3. 0) 
o.o5”*0 05" 
(0.03).03) 
5724.70’24.70' 
(959.36)59.36) 
0.07.07 
(0.05).05) 
-0.46*.46' 
(0.05).05) NA  
Toyss R  Uss -0.30’.30' -0.06.06 -0.30*.30' -0.47*.47' 5.99*. 9' 0.05.05 706.14*6.14' 0.311.  -0.16*.16' -0.11”. 1 ' 
(0.05).05) (0.04).04) (0.07).07) (0.13).13) (2.50).50) (0.06).06) (65.29)5.29) (0.19).19) (0.06).06) (0.02).02) 
Homeome Depotepot 0.12.12 0.15.15 -0.00. 0 -0.41.41 5.02.02 0.18.18 1416.49*16.49' -0.77*. 7' -0.06.06 -0.27*.27' 
(0.07).07) (0.10).10) (0.36).36) (0.63).63) (2.95).95) (0.11).11) (398.93)98.93) (0.25).25) (0.09).09) (0.04).04) 
Notes: pal;$nthesesStandard errors are in re t es 
p=O.OS; p=O.lO• Significant at .05 .. Significant at .10 
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significant effectt on any of  the internal,r al, historicalri al measures,asures, the effectct on MVA  trendd is dra­
matic.ti . MVA  for thisi  group hass only increasedsed by an averagerage of  $44 million,ion, which, if  
anything,thing, is lesss thann eitheri r the specialtycialty or thee groceryry retailers.tailers. Figure 5 depictsicts the trendd 
in MVA  for eachch of  the four groupsps of  retailerstailers examinedi ed in thisi  section.ction. We mustt concludel e 
­
thatt with the exceptionption of Wal-Mart, generaleral merchandisersrchandisers are no bettertter off thann the otherr 
classesses of  retailers.tailers. Wal-Marta  may have becomee morer  powerful,rf l, but the powerr is far from 
widespreadread amongstngst otherr retailers.tailers. 
The huge impact thatt Wal-Martart hass on trendsds for generalral merchandisersr andisers leadss us to 
revisiti i  the industrytr  levell analysis,l sis, wherere we had initiallyl  found thatt retailerstailers were bettertter off 
than manufacturersf t r rs in terms of  MVA  for as many as nine industries. Wal-Mart- art was 
included in the retailertailer group in eighti t of  thesese nine industries.tries. We redidi  the analysislysis afterr 
excluding Wal-Martart and found thatt only threee industriestri s remainedi ed wherere retailerst il rs were 
bettertter off  in termsr s of  MVA-apparel,A-a parel, computersters and jewelry. There were no significant 
changesnges in the trendsnds observedrved for the otherr variables.i bles. It would seem thatt the evidencece in 
supportport of  an increasese in the potentialntial powerr of  a single classs of  retailerstailers is largelyly thee con­
sequenceuence of just one firm's increasingsing power.r. Let us takee a look att thisi  firm..’  
Howw is Waf-Mart doing?l- art 
Figure 6 showss thatt Wal-Mart's Gross Margin/Sales and ROS over the pastt ten yearsrs 
have been declining,l  or att bestt remainedi d steady.eady. But, as we have argueded earlierrl  in thisi  
paper,per, thesese traditionaliti al profit measuresasures do not provide a completel te picture.re. Wal-Marta  is a 
growthth orientedted firm thatt is intentt on establishingtablishing a superiorerior long-termr  costt positioni i  versusrsus 
its competitorsetitors and hass investedted heavilyvil  towardsrds thatt objective.ti . That thisi  investmentent hass 
art’
been wisely madee is clearr from the steepep incline in the company's EVA  and MVA  over the 
samee period,ri d, ass depictedicted in Figures 7 and 8.. In contrast,trast, close competitorsetitors like Kmart have 
barelyr ly managedaged to keepp theirir EVA  stable,ble, while othersers like Searsrs havee takenn severevere hits.. 
y’s 
Othert r Categoryt  Killers 
atten-Toys R Us and Home Depott arere two otherr giantt retailerstailers thatt have attractedttracted a lot of  tten­
tion overr the pastt few years,rs, althoughl ugh not quitei  ass much ass Wal-Mart. We examinedined thesese 
two companiesnies ass well.l  The lastt two columns of  Table 6 summarizearize the results,ults, none of  
which are surprising.ri i . The trendsds in eachch measuresure for thesese two companiesni s follow Wal­
Mart’s'  pattern,ttern, althoughl ugh theyy havee not performedrf r ed nearlyrly ass well ass the latter.tter. Toys R Us hass 
Wal-Mart’sbeen increasingsi g its EVA  att the ratete of  $6 millionion per year,ar, in contrasttrast with art'  $84 
million,lion, while Home Depot hass been holding it steady.ady. Althoughlthou  both companiesi s are 
improving theirir MVA  att higherr yearlyrl  ratestes ($7066 millionion and $141616 millionion respectively)ectively) 
Wal-Mart’sthan the averagerage retailer,tailer, theyy arere far behindi  art'  annualal increasese of  $572525 million.i . 
Thus,, thesese categorytegory killers arere significantly bettertter thann average,rage, but theyy do not matchtch the 
stellarl r performance,rf r ance, both presentsent and potential,ntial, of  Wal-Mart. 
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CONCLUSIONNCLUSION 
This paperer hass examinedi ed the purportedrted shifti  in powerr from manufacturersufacturers to retailerstailers usingi  
more completel te measuresasures of  marketrket powerr and a broaderer sampleple of  industriestri s and retailtail 
classesses thann usedd in the two recentnt empiricaliri l investigationsti tions of  the issue.. It mayy alsol  be use­­
ful to investigateti ate the role of  wholesalersalers in the verticalti al channelel system.tem. There is little ref­
erencence in the businessi ss or academicdemic pressss to the powerr of  wholesalers,alers, perhapsrhaps becauseause theyy 
f-
have neitheri er the "store equity" nor the "brand equity" to differentiatetiate themselves.selves. Still, an“ r  i ” “  it ” 
empiricaliri l analysisl sis of  theirir performancerf r ance vis a vis manufacturersufacturers andd retailerstailers shouldl  be use­
ful. 
-
Powerer Shift:t: Dyadicadic Versusersus Aggregateggregate Viewie  
Our analysisl sis suggestsgests that,t, over the pastt decade,cade, retailerstailers have been faring worse than 
manufacturers,ufacturers, with only a few exceptions.ptions. Our datata do support,port, quitei  clearly,rly, an increasese 
in the power of  the growing Wal-Mart.art  Just ass clearly,rl , however,er, they show thatt not all 
retailerstailers have becomee more powerful,rf l, and manyy have lost power.r. We arer  witnessingsi  an era 
of  inter-retailerr- tailer competitionetition in which somee retailerstail rs like Wal-Martart competeete with othersers by 
operat­lowering theirir Gross Margins.. To keepp thisi  strategyrategy viable,, theyy focuss on lowering rat­
ing coststs and the costt of  investedted capital.ital. The successces  of  thisi  handfuldful of  retailerstailers is simplyl  
evidencece of  one (or some)e) retailerstailers gainingi  powerr over otherr retailers,tailers, nott of  manufactur­
ers,, in general,ral, losing power with respectct to retailers.il rs. Clearly, neither academicse ics and 
practitionerstiti ers havee beenn makingi  thisi  importantnt distinctioni  (seee Dickinsonins  and Hollander,r, 
199595 for a discussionsion of  thisi  issue).e). In specificcifi  given dyadici  relationships,l ti ships, Wal-Marta  and 
factur­
otherr low-cost discountersnters like Toys-R-Uss may have becomee more powerful,rf l, but thatt cer­
tainlyi l  doess not justify  thee sweepingping statementstements thatt arere beingi  madede so frequently,ently, aboutt a 
generaleral increasese in thee marketrket powerr of  retailers.tailers. Having laid the issue of a generaleral increasese 
r­
in retailtail powerr to rest,st, a fruitful directionti  for futurere researchearch would be to studydy the dynam­
ics of  dyadici  relationshipsl ti nships of  specificcifi  manufacturersufacturers and thesese few powerfulrf l retailers,tailers, and 
compare them with corresponding dyads that they form witht  the large majorityt  of  
­
retailers.7tailers.7 
Powerer Shiftsfts Withoutithout Profitfit Shiftsfts 
Is it possiblei l  for changesnges in relativeti  powerr to not necessarilyssarily resultlt in changesnges in relativel ti  
busi­profit? Increasesses in powerr needd not lead to immediatei te gainsi  in profit eitherr becauseause i
nesses may not know  how to use their  power  (in  whichch case the power  shiftt is 
meaningless),ningles ), or becauseause (ass we have discussedssed in thisi  paper)er) theyy may use it in wayss thatt 
exam-preserveserve futurere independencendence ratherther thann increasese shortrt termr  profit.fi . That is why we ­
ine not only currentnt profit butt potentialntial for futurer  profit ass well.l  
Itt may be arguedd thatt t manufacturersf cturers have driven down theirt  costs of operationtion tot  become 
more efficienticie  thant  retailersil rs and,, consequently,uently, theirt  profit has increaseded despiteite a loss off 
markett power.r. We believe such an argumentent missess a major point. Over thet  long term,t , and 
tent  years isi  certainlyt i l  longl  enough,, any efficienciesi ie i  thatt t one channell memberr mighti t gaini  
willl be bargainedi d away by the otherr partnerr iffthe latterr is more powerful.f l. Ass noted by Por­
ter (1990),), "powerful buyersrs orr suppliersliers bargaingain away the profitsrofitsforf r themselves"(p. ). 
Whenhe  Generall Motorsot  was suffering large lossess and itst  suppliersli rs were not, the situationti  
was not tolerated.ted. Largea  discountss were demandedded by GM  and obtained.i d. Inn exactlytl  the 
“‘po er  l s”(p. 
samee way as GM's power was wieldedi l  by thet  company's ex vice-presidenti i ent of  worldwidel i  
purchasing,sing, in  bringing down prices of  efficient automotiveotive suppliers,li rs, retailersil rs shouldl  be 
ablel  to extractr ct away profits from manufacturers,facturers, irrespectivective of  the sourcer e of  thosee profits.. 
’s ’s 
Itt is not reasonableonable to say thatt the tradee has becomee more powerfulf l relativei  to manufactur­
ers if, over the long term,r , we continue to observerve the oppositeite trend in theirir relativei  profit, 
both presentnt and potential.ntial. Withoutit  eitherr profit or markett value,, power is only a chimera,ra, 
comprisedri ed of  the trappingspings but not the substance.stance. 
It  may also be argueded thatt factorstors otherr than relativeti  power affectct profitabilityi  and,, were 
it not for the powerr shift,i , thosese factorstors may well have madee retailersailers even worse off  thann 
theyy are today.ay. Unfortunately,tely, thisi  argumentent too is indefensible.sible. The mostt common factorstors 
f ctur­
to be considered,i red, accordingrding to Industriali l Organizationi ti  theory,ory, are Concentrationtr tion and Prod­
uct Differentiationfer i  (measured,asured, in thisi  context,text, by variablesi l s such ass Advertising expenditureenditure 
and Private labeling).li ). We havee seen,en, in thisi  paper,per, thatt therere arer  few significant differencesces 
-
in Advertising trendsnds for the two groups.s. Messingerr and Narasimhani an (1995)5) have docu­
mentedted increasesses in privatete labelsl  in the groceryery industrytr  duringi  the seventiesenties and eighties.i ties. 
These authorsthors alsol  documentent somee increasesses in groceryery retailertail r concentration,ntration, especiallyecial y att 
­
the regionallevel.8 Yet,, retailertailer profitabilityil  hass suffered.ff red. We arere skepticalptical thatt thee publi­
cized growthth in privatete labelsls is a signall of growingi  retailtail power.er. While somee firms,, like 
Wal-Mart, havee increasedsed privatete labeling,li , others,ers, like Sears,ars, havee hadd to reduceuce emphasisphasis 
on theirir own labels,ls, and the nett is not att alll  clear.ar. And, retailertailer concentration,entration, evenn if  doeses 
increase,se, can lead to increasedsed marketrket powerr only if  therere is a concomitanti t decreasecrease in 
competition.petition. 
i l l v l.’ li-
The  Rolel  off Inter-RetailerI t etailer Competitionpetition 
Inter-retailert r- tail r competitionetition hass onlyl  intensifiedi t sifi  overr thet e pastst decadecade andd thist i  pressurer ssure 
forcesf r es themt  tot  competepete awayay theirt eir profits.r fits. Therer  isi  no doubtbt aboutout that.t at. Whatt arere thet e impli­
cationstions aboutout thet e marketarket powerr off retailers,r tailers, though?t ough? We wouldl  pointi t tot  thet e premiser ise off thet e 
Structure-Conduct-Performancetr ture-Conduct-Performance (SCP)( ) paradigm-anr i -an industryi try can enjoyj  marketrket powerr 
i li­
andnd abnormalnormal profitsr fits (the(the "performance" ini  SCP)) ass itit getsets morere concentratedcentrated (the(the "struc­“ rfor ance” “ truc­
ture" link)li ) onlyl  ifif firmsfir s ini  thethe industryi stry arere ableble toto colludell  (the(the "conduct" link)li ) andnd reducer ducet re” “ duct” 
competitionpetition (hence( ence thet e well-knownll-  termter  "monopoly power"). InI  otherther words,rds, reducedr duced hor­
izontali t l competitiontiti  isi  a necessaryssary pre-conditionition for increasedi  marketr t power and 
profitability.rofitability. Thatt criticalriti al linkli  ini  thethe SCP paradigmradigm hasas nott beenen madeade by retailers.tailers. If  itit had,ad, 
“ onopoly r”). r­
manufac­thet e resultr sult wouldl  be intensei t nse inter-manufactureri te - f t  competition,petition, whichi  wouldl  forcef rce nufac-
turersrs to competeete theirir profits awayy to retailers.tailers. To summarize,arize, increasedsed retaileril r power 
shouldl  havee led to:: (1)) high manufacturerufacturer competitionetition and low manufacturerufacturer profits;; and 
(2)) low retailertail r competitionetition and high retailertail r profits.f . What we observerve in mostt industriestri s is 
quitei  the opposite.site. 
We concludel  with the following quotestes from the businessi ss press:ss: 
Privatete labelsls arere like a creepingping paralysis.ralysis. Unless manufacturers,nufacturers, individuallyl  ass wellll 
ass in concert,ert, takeke a militantt attitudettitude and attemptttempt ot  stem thisi  encroachment,croachment, the paral­
ysisi  will proceeded from the extremitiestremities and eventuallyntually strikeri e at the heart,art, renderingering the 
brandnd manufacturernufacturer immobileil  (p.. ) 
ral-
Manufacturerscturers arere goingi  to havee to acceptept the ratherther unpleasantl asant ruthth thatt with the tre­
mendousndous powerr the chaini  wields,, whetherther it be national,tional, regionali nal or local,l, it is the retailertailer 
who now hass the supremereme powerr to makeke or breakak a productct in his own storesres (p.. ).. 
-
Amazing ass it mayy seem,em, thesese proclamationsl ations were madede more thann threer e decadescades agoo 
by Zimmerman (1959)!9)! Clearly,rl , the currentnt furor is not the first time thatt privatet  labelsl  and 
retailerstailers havee beenn seenen ass a threatreat to nationalti al brandsds and the powerr of  thee manufacturers.ufacturers. 
APPENDIXPPENDIX 
TABLEBLE A-l-l 
Sampleda pled Industriesdustries withith SIC  Codes  
Manufacturesfactures Retailers 
1. Apparell 
2300 Apparelpparel and  other  finished productscts 56000 Apparelpparel and  accessory stores
 
23200 Men,en, boys fins,, wrk c1thg.lt  Women’s
5621 omen's clothing 
 
2330  Womens,o ens, misses,, jrs. outerwearear 5651 Family clothingt 
 
23400 Womens,o ens, miss,, chid,, inft. undgrmtt 5311 Departmente art ent Stores
 
23900 Mise. fabricatedcate  textile 5331productscts  Varietya  storesisc.
Misc. General5399  ise. C l Mdse.dse. stores 
2. Appliancesliances 
elec. 5731 Radio, tv,, cons.  elect. stores36000 Electric, other  e eq. ex cmp.
 
36300 Householdusehold appliancesa ces + 
 
36344 Electric Housewaresuse ares and fans 5311 5331 5399#9#
 
3. Audiodio And  Videoi eo Equipmentuipment 
3651 Householdusehold audio  and video  eq. 5731 Radio,, tv.. consumers er elect.
 
3652  Phonog.g. records,, audio  tape, disk 5735  Recordr  and tape
 
+ 
5311 5331 5399#9# 
4. Computers 
3570 Computerputer and  officei e equipmentp ent 5734  Computerputer and Computerputer Softwaret are
 
3571 Electronicle t  computersuters + 
 
3572  Computerputer Storage devices  5311 5331 5399#9#
 
3575  Computerputer Terminalsi als
 
35766 Computerputer communicationication equip..
 
35777 Computerputer peripheral  ego necq. t 
(continued) 
TABLEBLE A-l-l 
Continuedontinued 
Manufacturesanufactures	 Retailerset il  
5.5. Drugsrugs 
2834 Pharmaceuticalhar aceutical 59122preparationsre arations
	  Drugrug and  Proprietaryroprietary
 
540000 Foodood stores
 
2834 
S411 Groceryrocery Storest re  
54122 Convenienceonvenience stores 
5
6.. Food and Beverageseveragesand	 Food 
200000 Food  anda  Kindredindred Productsr ducts	 540000 Food  Storest 
 
2011,1, 2013,20153,2015 ----- 2099	 5411 Groceryrocery Storest 
 
5412  Convenienceonvenience Storest 
 
----- 9 
7. Footwear7. Footwear 
3021 Rubberubber anda  plasticslastics footwearf t ear 5661  Shoee stores
 
3140 Footwear,ot ear, excepte cept rubberr er + 
 
 
40 	  
5311 5331  5399#99#
 
8. Furniture8. Furniture 
2510 Household furniturefurniture	 57000 Homeo e furnitureit re and  equip..2510 ousehold 
2511 Wood hshlds l  furn.,f r ., except.e ce t. upholsteredlstered 5712  Furniturer it re
 
2520 Officeffice furnituref r iture	 +
 
 ood 
20 	 
 
2522  Officeffice furnituref r iture ex. woodod	ex. 5311 5331 5399#9#
 
2531 Publiclic bldg.l . & reI. furnituref r it re rel. 
2540 Partitions,artiti s, shelving, lockersl c ers2540 shelving, 
2590 Mise. furnituref r it re anda  fixturesfi t res0 isc. 
Jewelrye elry9.  and  Watchesatches. 
3873 Watches,atches, clockscl c s anda  5944partsarts  Jewelryelry
 
3910 Jewelry,Je elr , silverware,sil er are, platedlate  ware + 
 
 
0 are 	  
3911 JewelryJe elry anda  Preciousreci s Metalsetals	 5311 5331 5399#9#
 
10. Office Machines10. ffke achines 
3578 Calculate,alc late, acct.acct. mach exe. computerc uter	 5311 5331 5399# ath ext. 
3579 Officeffice machinesac i es3579 
11.	 Tobacco Products 
2100 5912  Drug  and  Proprietaryiet  Stores 
11. Tobacco Products 
 Tobaccoacco productsr cts
 
2111 Cigarettesigarettes + 
2111 	  
5400  5411 5412@ 
 
12. ToiletriesToiletries and Cleaningleaning Aidsi s. an  
2840 Soap,a , detergent,eter e t, toilett ilet prepsre s 5411 Groceryer  stores
 
2842 Specialecial clean,clea , polishlis  prepsre s	 Convenience
 
 
5412 e ience stores
 
2844 Perfume,erf e, cosmetic,c s etic, toilett ilet 5912prep.re .	  Drug & proprietary  stores
 
+ 
5311 5331 5399## 
Toyss13.	  and Games 
3942 5945 Hobby, toy and game shops
 
. an  a es 
 Dolls,lls, stuffedst ffe  toyst s
 
3944 Games,a es, toys,t s, childc il  veh,e , excepte ce t dollslls +
3944 	  
5311 5331 5399## 
14.	 Wood and lumber Productsr ucts. ood an  Lu er 
2400  Lumberr and wood  products,r ts, exceptt 5200furn.
  Building materialterial hardware,r  gardenr  
2421 Sawmills,ills, planingl i  mills,ills, 5211gen..  Lumber  and other build.i  materialterial
 
2430  Millwork,ill or , veneer,r, plywoodl 
 
f r  
Notes:otes:	 #  Thesehese threethree SICsKS are defineddefined underunder Apparelpparel Retailersetailersare 
@ SIG Theseese ICs areare definedefined underder Drugr g Retailersetailers 
TABLELE A-2 
Trend  Regression Coefficientsi  for  all Industriesstries 
Performancerf r  Measureur  
Channelelnn  Memberber 
Apparelarel Manufacturersnufacturers 
Apparelpar lp  Specialtyialtyc  Retailerset ilers 
CMIS 
‘FE? 
G IS 
0.45*.  
(0.09) 
0.14 
ROS  
0.24*.  
(0.10)( .10) 
-0.05.  
ROAA 
0.34*.  
(0.14)( .14) 
-0.27*.  
ROIJ 
0.58* 
(0.21)( .21) 
-0.38*.  
1.51* 
EVA 
. 1 * 
(0.34)( .34) 
-0.13.  
EVA/SIS 
0.44*.  
(0.10)( . 0) 
0.02 
MVAVA 
11.03*.  
(2.80).80) 
43.34*.  
II5115 
-0.02  
(0.14).14) 
-0.18*  
SC&A/S 
YE’* 
G& I  
0.14* 
(0.04) 
0.18* 
A&PtSIS 
0.08* 
(0.03).03) 
-0.02 
Apparelpar l Retailerst ilers 
(0.10)( .10) 
-0.29*.29* 
(0.03)( .03) 
-0.14*1.  
(0.06)( .06) 
-0.20*.2  
(0.09)( .09) 
-0.34*3.  
(0.22)( .2 ) 
-0.97.  
(0.04)( .04) 
0.00 
(11.27).27) 
103.10*.  
(0.05).05) 
-0.15  
(0.07)( .07) 
-0.11*1  
(0.02).02) 
-0.07*0  
(0.05)(0.05) (0.03)(0.03) (0.04)(0.04) (0.09)(0.09) (1.03)(1.03) (0.04)( .04) (14.73).73) (0.09)0.09) (0.05)(0.05) (0.01)0.01) 
Appliancepl ai  Manufacturersanufact s 
Applianceliancep  Specialtyialty Retailerst ilers 
Applianceliancep  Retailerst ilers -0.41* 
0.12.1  
(0.15)(0.15) 
-2.79*7.  
(0.37)(0.37) 
4.   
(0.05)(0.05) 
-0.15*1.  
(0.06)(0.06) 
-0.77*7.  
(0.10)(0.10) 
-0.16*1.  
(0.04)(0.04) 
-0.49*4.  
(0.06)(0.06) 
-1.28*2  
(0.19)(0.19) 
-0.23*.2  
(0.04)(0.04) 
-O&6*0.66* 
(0.12)(0.12) 
-1.39*3.  
(0.23)(0.23) 
-0.38*3  
(0.10)(0.10) (1.51) 
2.62 
(6.11)(6.1 ) 
-2.56*5.  
(0.40)( .40) 
-1.60.  
(1.51 ) 
0.04 
(0.06)( .06) 
-0.35*3  
(0.05)( .05) 
-0.010  
(0.05)( .05) 
153.85**.  
(68.77).7 ) 
-79.61*  
(24.51).51) 
113.11*.  
(18.15).15) 
-0.16  
(0.09)0.09) 
-0.96*9  
(0.17)0.17) 
-0.14  
(0.10)0.10) 
-0.23**2  
(0.10)(0.10) 
-1.46*4  
(0.27)(0.27) 
-0.19*1  
(0.05)( .05) 
-0.06**0  
(0.03)0.03) 
-0.42*4  
(0.05)0.05) 
-0.08*0  
(0.02)0.02) 
AudioNideoManufacturersudi ideo Manufacturer s 0.363  -0.03.  -0.111  -0.212.  -0.05.  0.25*.2  45.31**3   -0.76*7  0.22**2  -0.16  
Audio-Videodi iu  Specialtyialty Retailerst ilers -2.51* 
(0.26)(0.26) 
5   
(0.09)( .09) 
-0.75*7.  
(0.10)( .10) 
-1.29*.2  
(0.19)( .19) 
-1.46*4.  
(1.10)( .10) 
-1.54*5  
(0.07)(0.07) 
-0.33*3  
(24.29).29) 
-60.32*  
(0.15)0.15) 
-0.89*8  
(0.12)(0.12) 
-1.30*3  
(0.13)0.13) 
-0.43*4  
AudioNideodi i eo Retailerst ilers 
(0.35)(0.35) 
-0.39*3.  
(0.09)( .09) 
-0.16*1.  
(0.17)( .17) 
-0.23*2  -0.3a* 
(0.20)(0.20) 
38.  
(0.27)(0.27) 
-1.434.  
(0.05)( .05) 
-0.0101 
(17.96).96) 
105.41*.  
(0.17)0.17) 
-0.131  
(0.25)(0.25) 
-0.18*1  
(0.05)0.05) 
-0.08*0  
(0.05)(0.05) (0.04)(0.04) (0.04)(0.04) (0.10)(0.10) (1.40)(1.40) (0.05)(0.05) (17.59)17.59) (0.10)0.10) (0.05)(0.05) (0.02)0.02) 
Computerputer Manufacturersanuf ct rs 
Computerputero  Specialtyialty Retailerst ilers 
Computerputero  Retailerst ilers 
-0.343.  
(0.20)(0.20) 
-5.83*8.  
(1.67)(1.67) 
-0.39*3.  
(0.06)(0.06) 
-0.15' 
-0.95*9  
(0.18)(0.18) 
-0.44 
(0.34)(0.34) 
1 *
(0.04)(0.04) 
-0.95*.9  
(0.17)(0.17) 
-0.39.  
(0.80)(0.80) 
-0.22*.2  
(0.04)(0.04) 
-1.61*61  
(0.32)(0.32) 
0.23.2  
(1.23)(1.23) 
-0.36*3.  
(0.10)(0.10) 
-8.06*0.  
(1.45)(1.45) 
0.46 
(0.35)(0.35) 
-1.656.  
(1.66)(1.6 ) 
-0.57*5  
(0.15)(0.15) 
0.62**62  
(0.28)(0.28) 
-0.010  
(0.05)(0.05) 
(12.21) 
-86.48*  
12.21 ) 
33.68**6  
(13.08)13.08) 
144.49*.  
(19.25)19.25) 
-0.19 
(0.14)0.14) 
-1.242  
(0.74)0.74) 
-0.151  
(0.10)0.10) 
0.55*.5  
(0.09)(0.09) 
-4.88*8  
(1.34)(1.34) 
-0.19*1  
(0.05)(0.05) 
-0.010  
(0.02)0.02) 
0.32*3  
(0.00)0.0 ) 
-0.08*0  
(0.02)0.02) 
DrugManufacturers 
Retailers 
r  Manufacturer s 
Drugr  tai lers 
1.51*.51  
(0.07)(0.07) 
0.24*2  
(0.03)(0.03) 
0.58*.5  
(0.04)(0.04) 
-0.13*1.  
(0.03)(0.03) (0.11) 
0.39*.3  
(0.06)(0.06) 
-0.59*.5  
(0.1  ) 
0.93*.9  
(0.10)(0.10) 
-0.95*9  
(0.18)(0.18) 
12.09* 
(1.18)(1.18) 
-0.10.  
(0.61)(0.61) 
0.82*8  
(0.07)(0.07) 
-0.00. 0 
(0.02)(0.02) 
359.30*.  
(48.81)48.81) 
46.75* 
(10.04)10.04) 
-0.52*5  
(0.04)0.04) 
0.020  
(0.03)0.03) 
0.76*7  
(0.06)(0.06) 
0.14*1  
(0.04)(0.04) 
-0.13*1  
(0.04)0.04) 
-0.03*0  
(0.01)0.01) 
Footwearrt  Manufacturersanuf t ers 0.40'40* 0.181  0.32.32 0.363  1.07*07* 0.30*30  22.14*1  -0.43*4  0.19**19  0.15*15  
Footweart  Specialtyialty Retailerst ilers 
Footweart  Retailerstailers 
(0.11)(0.1 ) 
0.49*49  
(0.13)(0.13) 
-0.38*3.  
(0.14)(0.14) 
0.393  
(0.25)(0.25) 
-0.15*1.  
'K' 
(0.25) 
0.67 
(0.48)(0.48) 
-0.21*.2  
(0.33)(0.3 ) 
1.01.01 
(0.69)(0.69) 
-0.36*3.  
(0.38)(0.38) 
0.868  
(1.18)(1.18) 
-1.767.  
(0.12)(0.12) 
0.10.1  
(0.23)(0.23) 
-0.01.01 143.61* 
(5.16)5.16) 
0.6363 
(4.32)4.32) 
61 
(0.10)0.10) 
1.24*24* 
(0.19)0.19) 
-0.141  
(0.10)0.10) 
0.25**.25  
(0.14)(0.14) 
-0.19*1  
(0.05)0.05) 
-0.010.01 
(0.02)0.02) 
-0.08*0  
(0.06)(0.06) (0.04)(0.04) (0.05)(0.05) (0.10)(0.10) (1.64)(1.64) (0.05)(0.05) (19.23)19.23) (0.10)0.10) (0.06)(0.06) (0.02)0.02) 
(continued)) 
TABLE A-2-2 
Trend Regression Coefficients for alll  Industriesstries 
­ ._"----­----_.._-_._._- _._.. -, _-~_.-
Performancerformance Measureasure 
.. _._ -
Channelnnel Membermber GM/SC !S ROS ROAA ROJI EVA EVA/S!  MVA  l/SI!  SC&A/SA!S A&P/S!S 
Furniture Manufacturersnufactu ers -0.35*.35* -0.27**.27** -0.48*.48* -0.53*.53* 0.03.03 0.111.  12.89*.89* -0.73*.73* -0.23*.23* 0.04*.04* 
(0.14).14) (0.14).14) (0.17).17) (0.22).22) (0.45).45) (0.14).14) (0.01).01) (0.11). 1 ) (0.11)0.1 ) (0.02).02) 
Furniturerniture Specialtycialty Retailerst ilersa  -0.52*.52* -0.36.36 -0.50.50 -0.72.72 -0.12.12 0.05.05 5.62.62 -0.01.01 -0.21.21 -0.10.10 
(0.21).21) (0.21).21) (0.29).29) (0.45).45) (0.42).42) (0.21).21) (3.15).15) (0.05).05) (0.14).14) (0.08).08) 
Furniturerniture Retailerst ilersa  -0.38*.38* -0.16*.16* -0.22*. 2* -0.37*.37* -1.45.45 -0.01.01 120.06*0.06* -0.14.14 -0.18*.18* -0.07*.07* 
(0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.05).05) (0.10).10) (1.40).40) (0.05).05) (16.91)6.91) (0.10).10) (0.05).05) (0.02).02) 
Jewelrye l  Manufacturersnufactu ers -0.31*.31 * -0.14.14 -0.25.25 -0.36.36 -0.20.20 0.04.04 7.96*.96* 0.26.26 -0.33**. 3** 0.02.02 
(0.09) (0.14).14) (0.19).19) (0.30).30) (0.22).22) (0.15).15) (1.50).50) (0.19).19) (0.15).15) (0.02).02) 
Jewelryelry Specialtycialty Retailerst ilersa  -2.01*.01 * -0.26.26 -0.31.31 -0.88. 8 3.75.75 0.22.22 20.11*. 1 * 0.81*.81* -2.17*.17* -0.30*.30* 
(0.45).45) (0.39).39) (0.41).41) (0.85).85) (2.27).27) (0.40).40) (7.43).43) (0.27).27) (0.37).37) (0.09).09) 
Jewelryelry Retailerstailers 4).39*-0.39* -0.15*.15* -0.22*. 2* -0.37*.37* -1.48.48 -0.00. 0 130.52*0.52* -0.13.13 -0.20*.20* -0.08’.08* 
(0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.05).05) (0.10).10) (1.61). 1 ) (0.05).05) (17.23)7.23) (0.10).10) (0.06).06) (0.02).02) 
ManufacturersOff.ff. Mach nufacturer s 0.76*.76* -0.05.05 -0.45*.45* -0.61*.61* -0.03.03 -0.02.02 18.91*.91 * -0.33*. 3* -0.10.10 -0.07*.07* 
(0.10).10) (0.08).08) (0.11).11) (0.20).20) (0.38).38) (0.13).13) (5.08).08) (0.12).12) (0.06).06) (0.03).03) 
Off.ff. Machcha  Retailerstailers -0.38*.38* -0.15*.15* -0.22*. 2* +3).37*-0. *7  -1.93.93 -0.01.01 151.50*1.50* -0.15.15 -0.19*.19* -0.08*.08* 
(0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.04).04) (0.10).10) (1.68).68) (0.05).05) (19.96)9.96) (0.10).10) (0.06).06) (0.02).02) 
Tobacco Manufacturersnufactu ers 2.11*1.  * 0.13.13 -0.36**.36** -0.35.35 34.1 o*.10  0.44*.44* 360.50*0.50* -0.92*.92* o.vo*0 90* -0.10*.10* 
(0.22).22) (0.16).16) (0.18).18) (0.34).34) (10.01)0.01) (0.17).17) (125.37)25.37) (0.14).14) (0.07).07) (0.05).05) 
Tobaccoba co Retailerstailers 0.24*.24* -0.13*.13* -0.59*.59* -0.95*.95* -0.10.10 -0.00. 0 46.75*.75* 0.02.02 0.14*.14* -0.03*.03* 
(0.03).03) (0.03).03) (0.11).11) (0.18).18) (0.61).61) (0.02).02) (10.040.04 (0.03).03) (0.04).04) (0.01).01) 
Toiletries Manufacturersnufactu ers 0.73*.73* 0.02.02 -0.12.12 -0.00. 0 3.98*.98* 0.32*.32* 81.10*.10* -0.15*.15* 0.61*1.  * 0.22*.22* 
(0.13).13) (0.07).07) (0.13).13) (0.21).21) (0.72).72) (0.06).06) (9.39).39) (0.06).06) (0.13).13) (0.03).03) 
Toiletriesil triese  Retailerstailers 4).12*-0.12* -0.14*.14* -0.29*.29* -0.51*.51* -0.92.92 -0.01.01 99.91*.91* -0.05.05 -0.06**.06** -0.05*.05* 
(0.04).04) (0.03).03) (0.05).05) (0.09).09) (0.98).98) (0.03).03) (11.00)1. 0) (0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.01).01) 
Toy Manufacturersnufactu ers 0.24.24 -0.11. 1 -0.34.34 -0.63.63 -0.39.39 -0.19.19 26.33*. 3* -0.40**.40** 0.40*.40* 0.011.  
(0.20).20) (0.27) (0.37).37) (0.56) (0.89).89) (0.27).27) (8.00).00) (0.20).20) (0.16).16) (0.24).24) 
Toyy Specialtycialty Retailerst ilersa  -0.21*.21* ‘k%Y0.20 0.211 ‘KY0.12 2.83*. 3*8  0.25**.25 * 153.32*3.32* 0.27.27 -0.25*.25* -0.1 v*.19  
(0.05).05) (0.12).12) (0.19).19) (0.33).33) (0.70).70) (0.12).12) (15.68)5.68) (0.19).19) (0.04).04) (0.03).03) 
Toyy Retailerst ilersa  -0.37*.37* -0.14*.14* -0.20*.20* -0.34*.34* -1.67.67 -0.00. 0 151.81*1.81* -0.13.13 -0.18*.18* -o.ov*0.09* 
(0.06).06) (0.04).04) (0.05).05) (0.10).10) (1.61). 1 ) (0.05).05) (19.06)9.06) (0.10).10) (0.05).05) (0.02).02) 
Woodod Manufacturersnufactu ers 0.56*.56* 0.02.02 0.00.00 0.011 2.14.14 0.36.36 16.35.35 -0.14**.14** 0.18**.18 **  0.01*.01* 
(0.20).20) (0.24).24) (0.29).29) (0.39).39) (2.23).23) (0.26).26) (9.61).61) (0.06).06) (0.08).08) (0.00).00) 
Woodood Retailerstailers -0.11*. 1 * -0.25*.25* -0.51*.51 * -0.65*.65* -0.57**.57** 0.06.06 86.84*.84* -0.24*.24* 0.10.10 -0.16*.16* 
(0.04).04) (0.05).05) (0.10).10) (0.13).13) (0.31).31) (0.05).05) (27.47)7.47) (0.04).04) (0.08).08) (0.02).02) 
Notes: Standard Errors are  in parenthesesst e s 
* **• Significantificant at p  =  0.05;5;.0  •• Significantificant at  p  =  0.10.10 
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u  
NOTESS 
1.. The CSR  simplyl  meansns thatt book valuel  at the end of  a periodi  is equalal to the book valuel  att the 
beginningi ing of  the periodi  plus earningsr ings minus dividends.ds. Capitall additionsiti ns are incorporatedrated as nega­
tive dividendss (Fairfield 1994).94). 
-
Futurere EVA  needd only be summeded over a finite time horizon,, because,ause, ultimately,tely, competi­
tive pressuresssures willl bring the residuali al earningsrnings of  a firm down so thatt it no longerr earnsrns more thann the 
cost of  its capitalital (Fairfield 1994;94; Stickneyy 1995).95). 
2.. ti-
Of  course,rse, manufacturers,nufacturers, in tum, mayy be ablel  to transfersfer somee of  theirir inventorytory coststs to3.. rn, 
theirir own suppliers.pliers. Lack of  datata preventednted us from separatelyarately analyzinglyzing raw material,terial, work-in­
progressress andd finished goodss inventorytory coststs to disentangletangle thesese mechanisms.chanisms. 
4.. Some currentlyr ntly usedd measuresasures of  EVA  only takeke into accountunt the cost of  long termr  debt.bt. We 
believel  thatt shortrt termr  debtt is veryr  important,rtant, especiallyecial y for retailers,tailers, and its costt shouldld alsol  be 
takenen into consideration.i eration. 
5.. See Rappaportaport (1986)86) for a simplel  explanationl nation of  the Capitali l Assets  Pricing Model and 
Grabowskiski and Vernon (1990)90) for a recentnt illustrationtion of  the costt of  capitalital calculation.l lation. 
6.. We recognizenize thatt allll manufacturerufacturer firm-retailertailer firm dyadss within an industrystry groupp mayy not 
havee experiencedrienced the same,e, if  any,y, powerr shifti  towardsrds the retailer.tailer. However,r, ass discussedssed earlier,rlier, 
our focuss is on determiningtermining whether,ther, on the whole,l , retailerstailers in differentt industriesstries are becominging 
morere powerfulrf l thann manufacturers.nufacturers. 
7.. On thee subjectject of futurere research,search, it mayy alsol o be usefulful to investigatestigate thee role of wholesalersl salers 
in the verticalrtical channelnnel system.tem. There is littlel  referencef rence in thee businessi ess or academicademic pressss to thee 
powerr of wholesalers,l salers, perhapsrhaps becausecause theyy haveve neitherither thee "store equity" norr thee "brand equity" to 
differentiatentiate themselves.selves. Still,i  an empiricalpirical analysisalysis of theirir performancerf r ance vis a vis manufacturersnufacturers andd 
retailerstailers will  be worthwhile.hile. 
“ tore ity” “ nd ity” 
8.. Our own preliminaryli i ary analysis,alysis, usingi g Censuss datata from the U.S. Departmentrtment of Commerceerce 
andd COMPUSTAT,, showss thatt overr thee periodri  thatt we analyze,alyze, the percentagercentage of totaltal retailtail salesles 
accountedcounted for by thee five largestest retailerstailers hass increasedased slightly,l tly, from 8.3%.3  to 10.1 %..1%. 
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